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PhD candidate, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science
ABSTRACT
This article considers the current state of the ﬁduciary duty to avoid conﬂicts of
interest as it applies to non-executive directors (NEDs) of UK companies,
particularly in the context of corporate opportunities discovered by them in an
outside capacity. The article charts the current law through the no-conﬂict and
no-proﬁt rules developed by the common law, and argues that the Companies
Act 2006 leaves signiﬁcant real-world uncertainties for the modern non-
executive with outside business interests. Empirical data gathered from the
largest listed companies in the UK are used to show that companies do
attempt to legislate for this problem, but in a way that is only partially
satisfactory. Finally, the article argues that the courts can and should develop
the law in a way that accords with these real-world contractual solutions and
the commercial expectations of NEDs, and suggests how the courts should
approach cases of this type.
Non-executive directors (NEDs) have long been regarded as a key part of the
corporate governance landscape, and it would now be rare to ﬁnd a signiﬁ-
cant UK company with dispersed or professional shareholders that does not
have at least one non-executive on its board. In some cases, especially in
private companies, these NEDs will be nominated by particular shareholders,1
while others will be appointed following a recommendation of the board’s
nominations committee (or similar body).2 Corporate governance scholars
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
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1See e.g. M Wright, DS Siegel, M Meuleman and K Amess, ‘Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts and Corpor-
ate Governance’ in M Wright, DS Siegel, K Keasey and I Filatotchev (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Cor-
porate Governance (Oxford University Press 2013) 541.
2The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2012) requires a nominations commit-
tee ‘to lead the process for board appointments and make recommendations to the board’ (B2). The
Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange (Financial Conduct Authority 2013) require all UK incorpor-
ated companies with a premium listing of equity shares to report on how they have applied the Code in
their annual report (LR 9.8.6 (6)).
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in both the agency theory3 and resource dependence4 traditions have offered
theoretical support for the idea that outsiders, who are independent of (or at
least separate from) management, can add value to a company, whether by
more robust oversight of the executives, or by the addition of valuable
resources (or both). And—although it is fair to say that the empirical
support for their impact on corporate performance is, at best, mixed5—the
value of NEDs has been widely acknowledged by regulators, policymakers,
institutional shareholders and other stakeholders. The UK Corporate Govern-
ance Code6 and the European Commission Recommendation of 15 February
20057 are two prominent best practice standards that wholeheartedly
endorse them.8
In the UK, these NEDs owe the same basic duties to the companies on
whose boards they sit as their executive colleagues. A unitary board (as
opposed to the two-tier model, which is common in parts of continental
Europe) has all directors sitting around the same board table, and the law
imposes the same duties on each of them. It may be that different directors
are held to different standards of care, according to their function in relation
to the company and their actual level of knowledge, skill and experience,9 but
the core legal duties that they owe to the company are the same.
3Agency theorists argue that a central role for corporate governance is mitigation of the agency costs that
arise from the separation of ownership and control, and many have postulated that outside directors are
well placed to undertake that function, provided that they are appropriately separated from manage-
ment. See e.g. EF Fama and MC Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26(2) Journal
of Law and Economics 301.
4Resource dependence theory suggests that NEDs can enhance corporate value by providing a wide range
of additional resources, including access to and communication with outsiders, legitimacy and advice.
See e.g. J Pfeffer and GR Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspec-
tive (Stanford University Press 2003).
5See B Lawal, ‘Board Dynamics and Corporate Performance: Review of Literature, and Empirical Challenges
(2012) 4(1) International Journal of Economics and Finance 22, for a review of the theoretical and limited
empirical support for the proposition that board composition has a positive effect on ﬁrm value (esp 25).
See also S Bhagat and B Black, ‘The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm
Performance’ (2002) 27(2) The Journal of Corporation Law 231, who ﬁnd that ‘ﬁrms with more indepen-
dent boards do not perform better than other ﬁrms’ (p 231). More recently, see C Volonté, ‘Boards: Inde-
pendent and Committed Directors?’ (2015) 41 International Review of Law and Economics 25, whose
study of 1,494 companies ﬁnds no evidence that the ‘independence’ of directors is positively related
to Tobin’s Q, which is used as a proxy for ﬁrm value.
6The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2012), Sections A4 and B1.2 (among
others).
7Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies
and on the committees of the (supervisory) board, 2005/162/EC.
8As regards shareholders, see e.g. the Investment Association’s (previously the Investment Management
Association) Principles of Remuneration 2014 (para ii, c), which emphasise the importance of non-execu-
tive directors in overseeing executive remuneration. As regards other stakeholders, see e.g. the TUC’s
Trade Union Voting and Engagement Guidelines (26 March 2013), which generally endorse the role of
(independent) non-executive directors (see in particular pp 8 and 9).
9See Companies Act 2006, s 174(2). Also relevant is the case law prior to the 2006 Act, in particular the
judgments of Jonathan Parker J in Re Barings plc and others (No 5), Secretary of State for Trade and Indus-
try v Baker [1999] 1 BCLC 433 and of Langley J in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley [2003] EWHC
2263. See also the discussion in D Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, Oxford University Press
2012) 441.
146 S. WITNEY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
04
:01
 15
 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
It is now a little easier for an NED to discover what her most important
duties are when she accepts a position on a company’s board: the main
duties of a director, at least while a company is solvent, are listed in Part 10
of the Companies Act 2006. But, in one very important respect, this newly-
appointed director will get very little help from that statutory statement of
duties: the law on ‘corporate opportunities’10 remains unclear,11 especially
in the way that it affects a part-time director who also has a ‘day job’. An
NED presented with an opportunity to make an investment, for example,
may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to discover what the law requires her to do with it.
Despite this unfortunate lack of clarity, in this article I will argue that it
remains open to the courts to apply and develop the law in a way that is con-
sistent both with commercial expectations and long-standing legal principles.
They can do this by adopting and developing the concept that directors,
especially those who are recruited by the company on an explicitly part-
time basis, are—with full knowledge and informed consent from the
company—able to act in different ‘capacities’ at different times, and that
when clearly not acting in their capacity as a director of the company con-
cerned, they do not owe ﬁduciary duties to the company. Although I argue
that this approach to directors’ duties has always been inherent in the
common law, and remains part of the law after codiﬁcation, it is not an
approach that has been clearly and explicitly developed in the cases or by
commentators.
If the courts do not adopt this approach, and instead choose to take a more
conservative line, I argue that the law would create real problems for those
non-executive directors who have a variety of other interests alongside the
part-time commitment they are willing to make to any one particular
company, and that remains true even after the reforms in the 2006 Act,
which have made it easier for conﬂicts to be authorised by the company.
That would be problematic because it is these very people—those with
expansive networks and deep experience in a particular sector—who are
among the most sought-after and the most valuable part-time directors
that a business can have.12
This article proceeds as follows: in Section A, I will argue that the no-con-
ﬂicts and the no-proﬁts rules, developed in tandem by the common law to
10In this article I use the phrase ‘corporate opportunities’ to mean opportunities to make investments, or
otherwise to make use of information or property, which arise to the director of a UK company, whether
or not those opportunities arise while the director is acting in her capacity as such.
11Some recent contributions to the continuing academic disagreement as to the scope of the duty include:
D Gibbs, ‘The Absolute Limit of Directors’ Fiduciary Liability for Conﬂicts Of Interest: The Director’s Per-
spective’ (2015) 36 The Company Lawyer 231; S Worthington, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies:
Addressing the Failure of Equitable Formulae’ (2013) 72 Cambridge Law Journal 720; SS Churk, ‘Just
Abolish the No-proﬁt Rule’ (2015) 7 International Company and Commercial Law Review 244.
12Resource dependency theorists would no doubt agree that such people would be among the most effec-
tive directors—see supra n 4.
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deal principally with corporate opportunity cases, have been replaced with a
single no-conﬂicts rule by the 2006 Act. That rule is a statutory restatement of
the common law, and the Act makes clear that its future application and
development by the courts will need to be consistent with the pre-2006
Act cases that relate to the no-conﬂict rule. However, I will argue that the
courts can treat cases dealing with the other aspect of the common law cor-
porate opportunities doctrine, the no-proﬁt rule, differently and are not
obliged to—indeed, they should not—follow the principles developed in
those cases. Such an approach, combined with the new authorisation mech-
anism, might suggest a more limited and manageable corporate opportu-
nities doctrine.
A closely-related question for the modern NED is whether she is able to
undertake multiple directorships and, if so, what approvals are needed for
those directorships themselves and any conﬂicts that subsequently arise
from them. Therefore, in Section A, I also set out the current state of the
law on multiple directorships.
In the second section of this article, I will argue that even the 2006 Act’s
arguably more permissive approach to corporate opportunities creates signiﬁ-
cant problems for the non-executive, especially one who has a range of inter-
ests in one particular sector: she may well ﬁnd herself in possession of
opportunities that give rise to a conﬂict, and may not be in a position to
seek informed consent to exploit them.
In the third section, I consider how, if at all, companies attempt to legis-
late for this problem through an examination of the conﬂict management
provisions in the Articles of Association of the 30 largest UK listed compa-
nies. I ﬁnd that none of these companies seeks to exempt non-executives
from corporate opportunities law generally (and nor could they), but all
purport to give directors a wide-ranging exemption from duties to disclose
information to their company, and all include a mechanism, or
combination of mechanisms, to allow conﬂicts of interest to be authorised
and managed.
Finally, I will suggest how the courts could apply these real-world contrac-
tual solutions consistently with the 2006 Act’s no-conﬂicts rule to establish an
application of corporate opportunities law, and indeed directors’ duties more
generally, which facilitates the appointment of specialist NEDs on boards,
while preserving the prophylactic effect of the corporate opportunities rules
in appropriate circumstances.
Section A: corporate opportunities law after the 2006 Act
The UK common law developed its rules on how directors should deal with
investment opportunities that come to their attention along two separate,
148 S. WITNEY
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but intertwined,13 tracks—adopting ‘the two negative principles which are
universal to the ﬁduciary doctrine of loyalty’.14 The result is a strict approach,
which seeks not only to prevent directors from abusing their position, but to
make sure that they are not led into temptation.
1. The twin tracks of the common law: the no-conﬂict rule
First, the reasoning adopted in many of the cases is that which is applied to
corporate conﬂicts of interest more generally, most classically stated (in the
context of self-dealing transactions)15 by Lord Cranworth LC in Aberdeen
Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers:16
it is a rule of universal application that no one having such duties to discharge
shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a per-
sonal interest conﬂicting or which possibly may conﬂict with the interests of
those whom he is bound to protect.
It is the no-conﬂicts rule that guides the judgment of Lord Hodson and the
dissenting judgment of Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phippsi,17 and appears
as an integral part of the reasoning adopted in virtually all corporate oppor-
tunities cases reported since. For example, it dominates the analysis of
Jonathan Parker LJ in the signiﬁcant case of Bhullar v Bhullar,18 and is strongly
endorsed by the Court of Appeal in the more recent case of O’Donnell v
Shanahan.19
Self-evidently, applying the ‘no-conﬂicts’ rule to corporate opportunity
cases required the courts to decide what the interests of the company
were, in order to establish whether the director had an interest (or owed a
duty to a third party) that was in conﬂict with those interests.20 As described
below,21 this was not always a straightforward exercise and they usually
approached the task very cautiously.
13Indeed, as observed by Richard Sheldon QC in O’Donnell v Shanahan ([2008] EWHC 1973 (Ch) at [176]), in
many cases the application of the two rules was so intertwined that it is hard to discern which is being
applied and how to distinguish between them.
14A Stafford QC and S Ritchie QC, Fiduciary Duties: Directors and Employees (2nd edn, Jordan 2015) 32.
15Self-dealing transactions are now dealt with by disclosure under Companies Act 2006, s 177, substan-
tially modifying the common law approach.
16[1843–60] All ER Rep 249.
17[1967] 2 AC 46.
18[2003] EWCA Civ 424.
19Re Allied Business and Financial Consultants Ltd; sub nom O’Donnell v Shanahan and another [2009] 2
BCLC 666.
20The important (post-resignation) case of IDC v Cooley ([1972] 2 All ER 162) illustrates how the no-conﬂicts
rule can apply to a conﬂict of personal interest and duty, even where the company had no ‘interest’ in
the opportunity because it would not have been available to it. Here, Roskill J argues that the defendant
was under a duty to the company to disclose the existence of the opportunity, and placed himself in a
position where his personal interests and his duty to the company were in conﬂict by not doing so.
21See Section 1.4.
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But whatever the court’s approach to the scope of the company’s inter-
ests, it might be assumed that application of the no-conﬂicts rule does not
require an assessment of how the director becomes aware of an opportu-
nity; what matters is whether the company could take advantage of that
opportunity, and therefore whether there is an actual or potential conﬂict.
However, I will argue in Section D of this article that, in fact, the courts
recognise that ﬁduciary duties have limits, that their scope is circum-
stance-speciﬁc, and that the circumstances in which the opportunity
arises are important in determining whether there is a ﬁduciary duty to
be navigated at all.
2. The twin tracks of the common law: the no-proﬁt rule
A second way in which the courts approached these problems, often in the
same judgments as they applied the (overlapping) no-conﬂicts rule, was to
apply another rule applicable to ﬁduciaries, this one famously articulated in
Keech v Sandford.22 In that case it was held that a trustee could not take a
lease renewal for himself, even though its renewal for the beneﬁt of the
trust had been refused. Lord King LC said:
It may seem hard that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might
not have the lease, but it is very proper that rules should be strictly pursued, and
not in the least relaxed…
Perhaps the best-known application of this rule to directors was by the House
of Lords in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver and Others.23 In that case, the harsh-
ness of the rule was expressed clearly by Lord Porter:
Their liability… does not depend upon breach of duty but upon the prop-
osition that a director must not make a proﬁt out of property acquired by
reason of his relationship to the company of which he is director. It
matters not that he could not have acquired the property for the company
itself—the proﬁt which he makes is the company’s, even though the property
by means of which he made it was not and could not have been acquired on
its behalf.24
An earlier application of the same rule can be seen in the joint judgment of
Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ in the High Court of Australia in Furs Ltd v
22[1558–1774] All ER Rep 230. See also Lord Herschell’s comments in Bray v Ford ([1896] AC 44, 50): ‘It is an
inﬂexible rule of a court of equity that a person in a ﬁduciary position… is not, unless otherwise
expressly provided, entitled to make a proﬁt.’
23[1942] 1 All ER 378.
24ibid 395. Lord Russell expressed a similar view (385): ‘Nevertheless, they may be liable to account for the
proﬁts which they have made, if, while standing in a ﬁduciary relationship to Regal, they have by reason
and in course of that ﬁduciary relationship made a proﬁt. ’ Viscount Sankey, Lord Wright and Lord Mac-
millian adopted similar language.
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Tomkies,25 which was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Gwembe
Valley Development v Koshy (No 3).26
In contrast to the no-conﬂicts rule, this alternative approach did not require
the courts to concern themselves with questions about the company’s inter-
ests, but rather to decide whether the opportunity arose while the director
was acting in a ﬁduciary capacity.27 Applying this logic, and putting the
obvious evidential problems to one side, if a director had been approached
independently, in her personal capacity, no proﬁt would arise ‘by reason’ of
her directorship, and so there would be no liability to account if she took
the opportunity for her personal beneﬁt. On the other hand, it would imply
that, if she was approached qua director, even if the company could not
take advantage of the opportunity itself—and so no conﬂict arose between
the director and the company—the courts would hold the director liable to
account, in the same way as Lord King held the trustee liable to account in
Keech v Sandford.
Whether these were two separate rules, or whether the ‘no-proﬁts’ rule is
merely a speciﬁc application of the ‘no-conﬂicts’ rule, was not clearly estab-
lished by the cases and has been the subject of considerable academic discus-
sion.28 However, the previous law is now only relevant in so far as it is
preserved by the 2006 Act and, as we shall now see, the Act expressly
adopts one of the rules and makes no mention of the other.
3. The Companies Act’s rejection of the no-proﬁts rule
It has often been observed that in adopting such a strict approach to corpor-
ate opportunities law, the UK courts made a clear policy decision that it was
more important to err on the side of safeguarding ‘the integrity of the
25(1936) 54 CLR 583, 592. The court said: ‘An undisclosed proﬁt which a director so derives from the
execution of his ﬁduciary duties belongs in equity to the company. It is no answer to the application
of the rule that the proﬁt is of a kind which the company itself could not have obtained, or that no
loss is caused to the company by the gain of the director. It is a principle resting upon the impossibility
of allowing the conﬂict of duty and interest which is involved in the pursuit of private advantage in the
course of dealing in a ﬁduciary capacity with the affairs of the company. ’ It seems clear from this
passage that the ultimate purpose of the rule is to prevent a conﬂict arising, so that no conﬂict is required
for the strict rule to operate when a director is acting as a director.
26[2004] 1 BCLC 131, 146 [44]. For a more thorough review of the history of the application of the no-proﬁt
and no-conﬂict duties to corporate opportunity cases see SM Beck, ‘The Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Cor-
porate Opportunity Reconsidered’ (1971) 49 Canadian Bar Review 80, 85ff.
27See P Koh, ‘Once a Director, Always a Fiduciary?’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law Journal 403, 406, who says
that ‘liability… depends on there being a connection or link between gain and ofﬁce’.
28See e.g. P Koh, ‘Once a Director, Always a Fiduciary?’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law Journal, 403, who
argues that, ‘it is perhaps more accurate to say that these are really independent rules’ (406); while
the contrary view is put by D Kershaw, ‘Does it Matter How the Law Thinks About Corporate Opportu-
nities?’ (2005) 25(4) Legal Studies 533 , who says that, ‘the weight of authority provides that the no-proﬁt
rule operates within the parameters of the no-conﬂicts principle’ (539). See also PL Davies and S
Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012)
16-151; J Lowry, ‘Codifying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act 2006’
(2012) 5 International Review of Law 7; and Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn, Jordans 2014) 268–75.
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director’s duty of loyalty’29 than to promote an ‘enterprise culture’,30 and a
number of scholars have argued that it is time to reconsider the demarcation
between those two objectives.31 To some extent at least, such a reconsidera-
tion was undertaken during the review process that ultimately led to the 2006
Act, and the most important innovation was a new approval mechanism
designed to make it easier for conﬂicts of interest to be authorised.32
However, in the process of restating the law, other important changes were
also made, and it is not entirely clear that these were fully understood by Par-
liament at the time. One such change was the apparent rejection (or, at least,
subjugation) of the no-proﬁts rule.
Section 175(1) of the 2006 Act, which both restated and modiﬁed the
common law, provides as follows:
A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a
direct or indirect interest that conﬂicts, or possibly may conﬂict, with the inter-
ests of the company.
This looks very much like the formulation of Lord Cranworth LC in Aberdeen
Rail.33 It uses the language of the no-conﬂicts approach,34 with no explicit
mention of the no-proﬁts rule, nor any language reminiscent of that used
to set the boundaries of the no-proﬁt rule, such as the phrase used by Lord
Porter in Regal (Hastings):35 ‘by reason of his relationship to the company.’36
29D Kershaw, ‘Lost in Translation: Corporate Opportunities in Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 25(4) Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 603, 603.
30J Lowry and R Edmunds, ‘The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The Shifting Boundaries of the Duty and
its Remedies’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 515, 521. See JH Farrar and S Watson, ‘Self-Dealing, Fair
Dealing and Related Party Transactions—History, Policy and Reform’ (2011) 11(2) Journal of Corporate
Law Studies 495 for a description of various attempts to balance the ‘efﬁcient transactions’ and the ‘con-
ﬂict of interest’ theories.
31See e.g. J Lowry and R Edmunds (n 30) who argue that the UK courts should be ‘inﬂuenced by the prag-
matism intrinsic in the jurisprudence generated by the Supreme Court of Delaware’ (537). David
Kershaw (n 29) offers a critique of the approach in Delaware and its origins.
32See Section B1 below.
33See supra n 16 and accompanying text.
34Interestingly, the section addresses itself to conﬂicts of interest between the director and the company,
and is not conﬁned to (although it does include) cases where personal interest conﬂicts with a duty to
the company, as the principle was expressed by Lord Herschell in Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51.
35See supra n 24 and accompanying text.
36Although the statement of duties laid out in Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006 is clearly not intended to
be exhaustive, it cannot have been intended to preserve such an important rule without doing so expli-
citly. Note that some commentators have argued that the no-proﬁts rule is restated by s 176 (including,
it seems, J Lowry in ‘Codifying the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: The (UK) Companies Act 2006’ (2012)
5 International Review of Law 7), but that is not the dominant view—see the discussion in D Kershaw,
Company Law in Context (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 574, including n 75 (which cites the
Oxford Annotated Companies Acts [OUP 2007] 10–36 as giving the counter-view), and in PL Davies
and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell
2012) 16-174. The dominant view is that s 176 does restate a version of the no-proﬁts rule, but not
one which would apply to a corporate opportunity. In any event, s 176(4) makes it clear that a conﬂict
of interest is also required in order for the section to be breached, so it is clear that even if the courts
were to interpret the provision more broadly, they will still need to go further than simply establishing
that the beneﬁt arose ‘by reason’ of the director’s directorship and ﬁnd some actual or possible conﬂict.
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But that is not necessarily the end of the matter, because section 175 does
not render the previous law redundant. On the contrary, section 170(4) tells us
that the ‘corresponding’ common law rules and equitable principles are rel-
evant in interpreting and applying the directors’ duties set out in the Act
(and therefore for determining when a conﬂict arises). If the common law
no-proﬁts rule was an integral part of the no-conﬂicts rule, then we cannot
entirely ignore pre-2006 Act cases that approached the corporate opportu-
nities question through the no-proﬁts lens, and we should consider
whether, if an opportunity arises to a director by reason of her directorship,
then there is automatically a legal conﬂict as a consequence of that fact. If,
on the other hand, they were separate (albeit overlapping) rules, then we
need to consider whether the 2006 Act has effectively abolished the no-
proﬁts rule, and we can now interpret the new law without reference to
those judgments that applied it (even if, in some cases, it is hard to disentan-
gle the two principles).37
It is submitted that, even though Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps38
regarded the no-proﬁt rule as a sub-set of the no-conﬂicts rule, it seems
clear that more recent judgments have not approached it in that way. They
have generally treated the no-proﬁt rule separately, in the sense that they
have not regarded it as bounded by the question of whether there is any
actual conﬂict, nor explicitly stated that the effect of the no-proﬁt rule is to
establish a deemed conﬂict upon which the no-conﬂict rule can bite. In Wilk-
inson v West Coast Capital and others,39 Warren J says:
There are two important rules which, if not qualiﬁed, generally affect directors,
as they affect all ﬁduciaries. They can be called the ‘no conﬂict’ rule and the ‘no
proﬁt’ rule…
Perhaps more signiﬁcantly this approach was also taken by the Court of
Appeal in the more recent case of O’Donnell v Shanahan,40 in which Rimer
LJ expressed the view that:
Once [the judge] had found, as he did, that the opportunity to buy Aria House
came to the respondents’ attention in their capacity as directors of the company
acting on the company’s business and using information they also obtained in
the course of so acting, that was the end of the point.
It was not ‘the end of the point’ because any conﬂict was thereby established
or assumed; it was so because the no-proﬁt rule did not require anything
further to be established.
37See references supra n 28 above for various academic views on the ‘one rule/two rules’ question.
38[1967] 2 AC 46, and see D Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 531.
39[2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch) [248].
40Re Allied Business and Financial Consultants Ltd; sub nom O’Donnell v Shanahan and another [2009] 2
BCLC 666
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It is true that the two rules stem from the same underlying principle: that
directors should not be allowed to put themselves in positions of conﬂict;41
and they have the same underlying purpose: ‘to control the opportunism of
those with limited access to the assets of others’.42 However, over time, the
rules came to be articulated and applied separately by the courts. It became
clear that the no-proﬁts rule, at least as expressed in numerous cases, did not
require an actual conﬂict, and was not therefore a sub-rule. Section 175, on
the other hand, plainly does require there to be a ‘conﬂict’, and it seems
clear from the Act that the fact that the opportunity arose while a director
was acting as suchwill not now be ‘the end of the point’ as it was for Rimer LJ.43
As one commentator says of the law, post implementation of the 2006 Act:
‘There is one rule, a no-conﬂict rule, and a prohibition on proﬁting when in a
position of conﬂict.’44 On one level, it may be right to say that the no-proﬁt
rule has been ’subsumed’ within section 17445 (in the sense that this is the
only relevant section to apply in corporate opportunities cases), but it is not
clear, where there is a conﬂict on which section 175 can bite, what work
there is left for the no proﬁt rule to do;46 and if there is no such conﬂict,
then it seems equally clear that there can be no breach of the rule. Given
this, it would seem more accurate to say that the no-proﬁt rule has been ren-
dered redundant by the Act, and cases that dealt with that rule on a stand-
alone basis, such that it was not constrained by the no-conﬂict rule, are
likely to mislead as to the current state of the law. Section 170(4) does not
require the courts to take that part of the common law into account,
41See e.g. the comments of the High Court of Australia in Furs Ltd v Tomkies (n 25). In the recent Supreme
Court case of FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, Lord
Neuberger refers with approval to Lord Upjohn’s assertion in Boardman v Phipps that the no-proﬁts rule
is part of the ‘wider’ no-conﬂicts rule.
42R Flannigan, ‘The Adulteration of Fiduciary Doctrine in Corporate Law’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review
449, 449. See also R Flannigan, ‘The Boundaries of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2004) 83 The Canadian Bar
Review 35.
43It is true that there are circumstances where the ‘no-conﬂict’ rule itself does not require an actual con-
ﬂict, such as where the company could not have taken advantage of the opportunity (see the discussion
of ‘capability facts’ in Section 1.4 below). However, it is notable that the draftsmen of the Act felt it
necessary to deal with that point speciﬁcally (in s 175(2)), but did not make any equivalent mention
of opportunities discovered while acting as a director, which by implication argues in favour of the
view that how the opportunity was discovered is not relevant to the determination of whether there
is a conﬂict.
44B Hannigan, Company Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 11–12. See also L Sealy and S
Worthington, Sealy and Worthington’s Cases and Materials in Company Law (10th edn, Oxford University
Press 2013) [7.24] 370, who say: ‘to the extent that the statutory no conﬂict rule and the third party
beneﬁts rule [S.176] fails to cover the no proﬁt rule, the new statutory regime deviates from the existing
equitable rules.’
45See e.g. E Lim, ‘Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A New Analytical Framework’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review
242 who says ‘there is no longer a standalone no-proﬁt rule as s 175(2) has subsumed it under the no-
conﬂict rule’ (252).
46It seems now that there is also no difference between the remedies available for a breach of the no-proﬁt
rule and the no-conﬂict rule. Sarah Worthington (‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies’ [n 11]) had
suggested that the availability of a proprietary remedy might depend upon which rule applied; however,
that distinction was not adopted by the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar
Capital Partners LLC ([2014] UKSC 45).
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because that part of the common law does not ‘correspond’ to an equivalent
general duty under the Act.
In fact, the effective abolition of the ‘no-proﬁt’ rule as a matter of corporate
law may make little practical difference,47 and it seems likely that Parliament
was of the view that no meaningful change in law followed from its reformu-
lation of the duty solely as a duty to avoid conﬂicts of interest.48 That is
because, as pointed out by Davies and Worthington,49 the leading no-proﬁt
cases, including Regal (Hastings) itself, can be re-characterised as ‘no-conﬂict’
cases. In Regal, the court is clearly sceptical about the directors’ motives for
investing in the subsidiary personally, especially as a sale was contemplated,
and the board clearly did face a conﬂict of interest when deciding whether to
raise money through the parent company or to invest it itself. Although the
court assumed their bona ﬁdes, there is no suggestion that they did not
face a conﬂict. Other commentators50 have pointed out that there is a signiﬁ-
cant overlap in coverage between the two rules, with one observing that in
many cases ‘judicial language mixes the two rules simply because conﬂict
and proﬁt are both present’.51 In arguing that the 2006 Act effectively abol-
ished the no-proﬁt rule for directors, it should be pointed out that, in some
signiﬁcant cases since the Act came into force, the ‘no-proﬁts’ rule has been
repeated or afﬁrmed by the courts. For example, in Thermascan v Norman,52
a case about exploitation of a corporate opportunity after termination of a
directorship, the parties agreed that section 175 did not change the pre-exist-
ing law, and the judge, David Donaldson QC, appeared to concur. However,
the principles that were then enumerated—taken from a pre-2006 Act case,
Foster Bryant Surveying Limited v Bryant53—focused very much on conﬂicts
47However, as made clear by RP Austin, although the rules cover much of the same ground, there are (at
least in theory) cases where only one of the rules will apply—see RP Austin, ‘Fiduciary Accountability for
Business Opportunities’, in PD Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial Relationships (Sweet & Maxwell 1987)
146–47. See also SS Churk, ‘Just Abolish the No-Proﬁt Rule’ (2015) 7 International Company and Com-
mercial Law Review 244, who gives examples of situations in which the no-proﬁt rule could give rise
to difﬁculties in practice.
48For example, the remarks of Lord Goldsmith in Grand Committee on the relevant sections of what was
then known as the Company Law Reform Bill make clear that, although there were certain intended
liberalisations of the law (such as the inclusion of a reasonableness test in s 175(4)(a), and the procedure
allowing the board to approve conﬂicts), no dramatic change was intended to the basic prohibition as it
related to the exploitation of corporate opportunities (HL Deb 6 February 2006, vol 678, cols GC285-
GC294 and HL Deb 9 February 2006, vol 678, cols GC322-GC329).
49PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) 16-149–16-151.
50See e.g. P Koh, ‘Once a Director, Always a Fiduciary?’ (2003) 62(2) Cambridge Law Journal, 403, 407; SM
Beck, ‘The Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Corporate Opportunity Reconsidered’ (1971) 49 Canadian Bar
Review 80.
51SM Beck, ‘The Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Corporate Opportunity Reconsidered’ (1971) 49 Canadian Bar
Review 80, 90.
52[2009] EWHC 3694 (Ch).
53[2007] EWCA Civ 200 [8]. In fact the Court of Appeal was itself quoting from an earlier unreported case,
Hunter Kane Ltd v Watkins [2003], where the judge applied the principles set out by Lawrence Collins J in
CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet and another [2001] 2 BCLC 704.
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of interest (or a conﬂict of interest and duty), and did not imply that a situation
in which there was in fact no conﬂict would automatically give rise to a duty to
account if the director became aware of an opportunity in the course of acting
as a director. In fact, it was said that:
A requirement to avoid a conﬂict of duty and self-interest means that a director
is precluded from obtaining for himself, either secretly or without the informed
approval of the company, any property or business advantage either belonging
to the company or for which it has been negotiating, especially where the direc-
tor or ofﬁcer is a participant in the negotiations.54
Such a narrow formulation was, perhaps, driven by the facts of the particular
case, and may not have been intended to be a comprehensive statement of
the law.
More signiﬁcantly, in Sharma v Sharma,55 Jackson LJ summarised the duty
under section 175 as follows:
A company director is in breach of his ﬁduciary or statutory duty if he exploits for
his personal gain (a) opportunities which come to his attention through his role
as director or (b) any other opportunities which he could and should exploit for
the beneﬁt of the company .
However, in this case, the parties had conceded that there would have been a
breach of the relevant rule if the shareholders had not consented to the direc-
tor’s personal pursuit of the opportunity,56 and so questions as to the ambit of
the rule itself were not before the court. Nevertheless, there must remain
some doubt as to the way in which the courts will approach section 175 in
subsequent cases, in light of these authoritative comments.
4. The Companies Act’s version of the no-conﬂicts rule
Even if, as argued above, the common law’s application of the no-proﬁts rule
has limited relevance to directors since the 2006 Act, as a result of section 170
(4), the common law clearly does remain relevant to the question of whether
there is a conﬂict, at least to the extent not varied by section 175. And, as
already noted, the courts have traditionally been very cautious when deﬁning
the company’s interests for this purpose. First, they have taken the view that if
the director herself could have any impact on whether the company was
capable of taking advantage of the opportunity—for example, by persuading
shareholders to lift a constitutional bar to the acquisition—then they will
simply assume that the company does have an interest in the opportunity;
in other words, they will regard capability facts as immaterial in determining
54[2007] EWCA Civ 200 [8].
55[2013] EWCA Civ 1287 [52].
56[2013] EWCA Civ 1287 [36].
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whether there is a conﬂict. So, in Bhullar,57 the fact that the board, at the insti-
gation of the claimants, had resolved not to undertake any new investments
was not relevant. The board was not given the opportunity to reconsider this
determination, and the court will not second guess what answer it would have
given if it had been. The judgment in Bhullar closely follows the logic of Board-
man v Phipps,58 in which the majority held that neither rejection of the oppor-
tunity by the trustees, nor the fact that it would have been necessary to apply
to court in order to take advantage of the opportunity, were relevant in decid-
ing whether Mr Boardman, solicitor to the trust, was conﬂicted in pursuing an
opportunity for personal beneﬁt.
There were, however, limits to this approach. For example, Warren J inWilk-
inson v West Coast Capital,59 said that if the director who wanted to take
advantage of the opportunity was also a shareholder who could (in that
capacity) prevent the company from taking advantage of the opportunity,
then it would not be a breach of duty for her to exploit it personally (although
the judge does also say that there might be an obligation for directors to bring
the opportunity to the attention of the board, even if discovered ‘other than in
their capacities as directors’). It also seems that an absolute statutory prohibi-
tion on the company making the acquisition would be relevant in determin-
ing the scope of its interests.60 However, these limits are fairly extreme, and in
a case in which a constitutional barrier to acquisition could be lifted by a
shareholder vote—and the director, acting in a separate, non-ﬁduciary
capacity, could not block such a shareholder decision—then the barrier to
acquisition was not relevant at common law.
Section 175(2) conﬁrms that strict approach, andmay even cast doubt on the
limited capability-type exceptions discussed inWilkinson, saying that it is ‘imma-
terial whether the company could take advantage of the… opportunity’.61
The other possible line of argument for a director who wants to pursue an
opportunity personally might be that, as a commercial matter, the company
would not be interested in it. In this regard, she might say that it was
outside of the company’s existing or anticipated sphere of activity.
The common law has not been entirely clear as to its position on this
line of argument,62 although some support for it appears in the authorities,
57[2003] EWCA Civ 424.
58[1967] 2 AC 46.
59[2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch).
60ibid [296].
61Note the discussion in D Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 572,
which suggests that the apparently more ﬂexible wording in s 175(4)(a) (‘cannot reasonably be regarded
as likely to give rise to a conﬂict of interest’) than under the common law (‘real, sensible possibility of
conﬂict’) could be said to mean that the Companies Act will allow capability facts to be taken into
account. However, given the clear contradiction with s 175(2) the author concludes that s 175(4)(a)
cannot refer to capability facts, a view with which the present author respectfully concurs.
62See J Armour, ‘Corporate Opportunities: If in Doubt Disclose (But How?)’ (2004) 63 Cambridge Law
Journal 33, who says (34) that some ‘proximity’ of the opportunity to the company’s interests is required.
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 157
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
04
:01
 15
 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
most recently in Wilkinson v West Coast Capital.63 In that case, obiter dictum
of Warren J suggests that the qualiﬁcation to the no-conﬂict rule ﬁrst pro-
posed by Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps64—that there must be a ‘real,
sensible possibility’ of conﬂict (and not just a theoretical one)—would mean
that taking an opportunity in a completely different line of business would
not render the director in breach of the duty to avoid conﬂicts.65 Given that
the rule is predicated on the existence of a conﬂict, the principle of this
approach is easy to understand. However, from a policy point of view,
one can see why the court might be sceptical of dismissing the possibility
of a conﬂict in cases where the company’s current line of business is in an
apparently unrelated area, for the same reason that they have been unwill-
ing to dismiss conﬂicts in cases where the company is subject to a limit-
ation that restricts its ability to take up the opportunity if that restriction
is capable of being lifted by the board or the shareholders. The company’s
line of business is often in the control of the board and, even where it is
not, the directors could ask shareholders to consider widening the
current scope of the company’s business interests if they believe that it
would be in the company’s commercial interests to pursue a particular
investment opportunity.
In O’Donnell v Shanahan66—looking through the no-proﬁts lens—the
Court of Appeal dismissed any business area limitations. However, as noted
above, the Court treated the no-proﬁts rule and the no-conﬂicts rules as
entirely separate in this case, and its rejection of scope of business restrictions
was speciﬁcally in the context of its application of the no-proﬁts rule.67 As
However, see also D Prentice and J Payne, ‘The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine’ (2004) 120 Law Quar-
terly Review 198 who argue that, although ‘the test is probably that the opportunity must be one that
falls within the company’s line of business’, ‘it would be in keeping with the approach in Bhullar to treat
anything of economic value to the company as potentially within the company’s line of business’ (201).
63[2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch).
64[1967] 2 AC 46.
65At [253] Warren J says: ‘A company with a wide objects clause could, in theory, diversify its business in
limitless ways if the necessary funding were available. But a director of a company selling fashion cloth-
ing for women could hardly be in breach of the “no conﬂict” rule if he took a stake in a company dis-
tributing farm machinery, even if the company did have such a wide objects clause. There would simply
be no “real sensible possibility” of conﬂict. In contrast, if the board of the fashion clothing company had
been actively considering diversiﬁcation into the distribution of farm machinery, there would be a real
sensible possibility of conﬂict in a director taking a stake in such a company.’ See also Bhullar v Bhullar
[2003] EWCA Civ 424, where it seems relevant to the decision that the relevant opportunity was to
acquire land which was adjacent to another existing commercial property that the company already
owned; the implication is that there would have been no duty to disclose an opportunity to acquire
an investment property which had no connection whatsoever to the existing or anticipated future
business of the company.
66Re Allied Business and Financial Consultants Ltd; sub nom O’Donnell v Shanahan and another [2009] 2
BCLC 666
67Rimer LJ does say that the partnership case of Aas v Benham is ‘of relevance in considering the extent
and application of the ‘no proﬁt’ and ‘no conﬂict’ rules’ [67]. However, this is in a part of the judgment
dealing speciﬁcally with the no proﬁt rule.
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argued above, that rejection is no longer directly relevant.68 On the other
hand, Rimer LJ’s ﬁnding that there was also a breach of the no-conﬂicts rule
was for a different reason: he did not appear to regard the taking of the oppor-
tunity as the relevant conﬂict, but rather the question as to whether the
company should receive a commission (a question in relation to which the
directors did have a clear conﬂict on the facts of the case). On that analysis,
the pre-2006 Act law, which appeared to give room for arguments based
on business line restrictions, remained, even after the decision in O’Donnell.
However, it is not clear whether it has survived the Act’s new formulation
of the no-conﬂicts rule.
As to the position after the 2006 Act, it has been argued69 that a scope of
business restriction, as was referred to in Wilkinson, could be preserved by
section 175(4)(a) of the 2006 Act, which says that there is no breach of the
no-conﬂicts rule if ‘the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to
give rise to a conﬂict of interest’. This phrase, similar to that used by Lord
Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps and adopted in Wilkinson by Warren J, could
be used by the courts to conﬁrm (or re-establish) that the current legal pos-
ition is that there are business-line restrictions on the no-conﬂicts rule, even
if they continue to approach the deﬁnition of a company’s scope of business
cautiously, taking a broad view of which opportunities the company can be
expected to want to pursue, or at least consider. However, this remains a
matter of speculation, and it is perhaps unlikely that the courts will take up
the opportunity that section 175(4)(a) offers them.70
5. Application of the no-conﬂicts rule to multiple directorships
Many NEDs, perhaps even most, act as directors of more than one company,
and indeed this may be regarded positively by the companies concerned, on
the basis that it will broaden the experience and network of the NED. Most
Articles do not ban NEDs from holding other directorships,71 and the fact
that an NED (or even an executive director) is likely to have outside commit-
ments, including other directorships, is acknowledged in many best practice
68See E Lim, ‘Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A New Analytical Framework’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 242
for a more detailed discussion of Rimer LJ’s reasoning. Lim argues that Rimer LJ was wrong to reject the
scope of business test even in applying it to the no-proﬁts rule.
69D Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 573. David Kershaw
acknowledges that there is ‘nothing in the legislative record’ to support the view that this was the inten-
tion of s 175(4)(a), and the argument is made tentatively.
70The general reluctance of the courts to get involved in matters of commercial judgement is well estab-
lished—see e.g. Carlen v Drury [1812] 35 ER 61. Their unwillingness to involve themselves in deﬁning the
company’s ‘line of business’ to exclude certain activities is, perhaps, consistent with that general
approach.
71In summarising the results of an empirical study carried out for the purposes of the review process that
led to the 2006 Act, it was said to be ‘very rare for non-executive directors to be barred from being direc-
tors of other ﬁrms, conﬁrming their advisory role’––see S Deakin and A Hughes, ‘Directors’ Duties:
Empirical Findings Report to the Law Commissions, August 1999, s 5.1. See also Section C below.
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codes. For example, the UK Corporate Governance Code72 says that a full-time
executive director should not be permitted to take on ‘more than one non-
executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such
a company’, while NEDs (including the chairman) are required to ensure
that they have ’sufﬁcient’ time available, and required to disclose their
‘other signiﬁcant commitments’. The Code’s provisions are therefore
focused more on the need for directors to have sufﬁcient time available,
rather than being concerned speciﬁcally with conﬂicts of interest.73
Academic evidence of the impact of multiple directorships on corporate
performance is unclear, but there are a number of studies that ﬁnd a negative
correlation between ﬁrm performance and the number of outside appoint-
ments of board members.74 Most recently, however, Christophe Volonté, in
a study of 1,494 companies from the Swiss Performance Index from 2005 to
2012, found ‘no strong empirical evidence that … the number of outside
activities [of directors] would affect ﬁrm value’.75
In any event, these studies are generally concerned with the question of
whether there is a link between ‘busy’ boards and performance, using
outside directorships as a proxy for ‘busy-ness’, and (since outside commit-
ments can come in many forms) are not focused on the effect of multiple
directorships per se. And neither do these studies look at the impact of mul-
tiple directorships in smaller and unlisted companies. In short, it is not poss-
ible to draw any speciﬁc prescriptions for the law’s attitude to multiple
directorships from the academic evidence.
Nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century UK courts certainly had no
problem with multiple directorships; indeed, the position famously taken by
72Financial Reporting Council 2012, B3.
73Other Corporate Governance Codes have tended to take a similar approach: for example, the Australian
Code (ASX, 2nd edn, August 2007, amended 2010, p 19) says that ‘directors should consider the number
and nature of their directorships and calls on their time from other commitments’, while the US Council
of Institutional Investors (Policies on Corporate Governance, April 2015, 2.11) provides that: ‘Absent
unusual, speciﬁed circumstances, directors with full-time jobs should not serve on more than two
other boards. Currently serving CEOs should not serve as a director of more than one other
company, and then only if the CEO’s own company is in the top half of its peer group. No other director
should serve on more than ﬁve for-proﬁt company boards.’
74See e.g. P Jiraporn, YS Kim and WN Davidson III, ‘Multiple Directorships and Corporate Diversiﬁcation’
(2008) 15(3) Journal of Empirical Finance 418; EM Fich and A Shivdasani, ‘Are Busy Boards Effective Moni-
tors?’ (2006) 61(2) Journal of Finance 689. See also VD Sharma and ER Iselin, ‘The Association between
Audit Committee Multiple-Directorships, Tenure, and Financial Misstatements’ (2012) 31(3) Auditing: A
Journal of Practice & Theory 149, who conclude from a study of 191 companies who had misstated their
ﬁnancial statements (matched with 191 companies who had not) that ‘independent audit committee
members serving on multiple boards may be stretched too thinly to effectively perform their monitoring
responsibilities’, given the positive correlation they found between multiple directorships and misstate-
ment. However, they did not ﬁnd this relationship for audit committee members with accounting exper-
tise, suggesting that directors with special skills can have a positive impact even if heavily committed
elsewhere.
75C Volonté, ‘Boards: Independent and Committed Directors?’ (2015) 41 International Review of Law and Econ-
omics 25. See also S Ahn, P Jiraporn and YS Kim, ‘Multiple Directorships and Acquirer Returns (2010) 34
Journal of Baking & Finance 2011, who do ﬁnd that multiple outside board seats are related to poor acqui-
sition performance, but ‘only when the number of multiple directorships reaches a high threshold’ (p 2026).
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the court in London & Mashonaland Co Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration Co
Ltd,76 subsequently approved by the House of Lords,77 was that a director
could even act as a director of two competing companies. This view was cer-
tainly controversial,78 and the Mashonaland principle has since been con-
strued narrowly.79 Following Plus Group Ltd v Pyke,80 it would seem hard for
an active director, even a non-executive, to be a director of two competing
companies without speciﬁc authorisation.
But even after the decision in Plus Group, it had not been entirely clear
where to draw the dividing line between a situation that is prohibited
because the director is conﬂicted, and one where there is no legal bar to
the dual (or multiple) directorships. That is because the courts were prepared
to accept that something short of an actual conﬂict was enough for the law to
intervene. As Sedley LJ81 put it:
there has never been any warrant for treating [the Mashonaland decision], or
therefore its endorsement in the House of Lords, as a licence for directors or
other ﬁduciaries to put themselves or to stay put in situations where their
duties and/or interests can come into conﬂict. (emphasis added)
The use of the word ‘can’ in this extract was deliberate; a little earlier in the
judgment Sedley LJ conﬁrms that the law will intervene where there is an
‘impending or potential breach’, and afﬁrmed the view of Lawrence Collins
J in CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet and another82 that the correct formulation
of the relevant legal principle was that ‘a ﬁduciary must not place himself in
a position where his duty and his interest may conﬂict’ (emphasis added).
Indeed, in his famous formulation in Aberdeen Rail Co v Blaikie Brothers,83
Lord Cranworth LC made it clear that directors could not enter into engage-
ments where a personal interest ‘possibly may conﬂict’ with the interests of
the company. The potential breadth of that formulation was recognised by
Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps;84 he (as noted above) said that it
should be restricted to cases where there was a ‘real sensible possibility of
conﬂict’.85 However, in cases of multiple directorships, it would not always
76[1891] WN 165.
77Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 (Lord Blanesburgh).
78See the judgment of Sedley LJ in Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370, who cites various academic
commentaries. See also M Christie, ‘The Director’s Fiduciary Duty Not to Compete’ (1992) Modern Law
Review 506, who concludes that the decision is ‘inconsistent with long established principles of Equity
regulating directors’ (520).
79See Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370 [84] in which Sedley LJ said: ‘If one bears in mind the high
standard of probity which equity demands of ﬁduciaries, and the reliance which shareholders and credi-
tors are entitled to place upon it, the Mashonaland principle is a very limited one.’
80[2002] EWCA Civ 370.
81Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370 [88].
82[2001] 2 BCLC 704 [84].
83[1843-60] All ER Rep 249.
84[1967] 2 AC 46.
85[1967] 2 AC 46, 124. The full quotation from the case bears repeating: ‘In my view [the phrase “possibly
may conﬂict”] means that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the
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be easy to determine whether a possible conﬂict (perhaps a chance that the
companies would compete in future) could be ruled out as being too remote.
At the same time, it was very clear that the scope of the duty would depend
on the facts of the case.86
As discussed extensively above, the Companies Act 2006 reformulated the
general duty to avoid conﬂicts, while at the same time introducing new pro-
cedures to allow directors to authorise the conﬂicts of their fellow directors.
During the Parliamentary Standing Committee debates about what is now
section 175, there had been some disagreement as to whether this reformula-
tion would make it more difﬁcult for directors to take on multiple director-
ships, with some arguing that the clause would involve a signiﬁcant change
to the common law position, on the basis that any other directorship might
well put the director in a position of potential conﬂict.87 However, the govern-
ment insisted that the clause merely reﬂected the existing common law pos-
ition; the Solicitor General said that that there was no problem with multiple
directorships88 but that, if the fact of a second directorship gave rise to a fore-
seeable conﬂict of interest, it would need to be authorised by the directors or
otherwise dealt with in accordance with the company’s constitution, and the
directors or the members would need to make an ‘informed decision’ as to
whether it should be permitted.89 There does seem to be more scope here
for section 175(4)(a) to take on a role similar to that which is argued for it
above in relation to corporate opportunities. While, in the face of a speciﬁc,
proﬁtable investment opportunity, it might be difﬁcult for the courts to
apply a clear business line restriction to say that no conﬂict arises,90 it may
be easier for them to conclude that it is not likely that there will be circum-
stances in which a conﬂict will arise in future, if a director holds a position
with two companies that have entirely different businesses (at least no
more likely than if he is undertaking any other commercial activity outside
of the company).
particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conﬂict; not that you could
imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events not contemplated
as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, result in a conﬂict.’
86See e.g. Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, 107, a passage cited by Brooke LJ in Plus
Group [2002] EWCA Civ 370 [75] when he says that ‘the facts and circumstances of each case must
be carefully examined to see whether a ﬁduciary relationship exists in relation to the matter of
which complaint is made’.
87Company Law Reform Bill [Lords] Deb 11 July 2006, cols 607–11.
88Indeed, he acknowledged that there may be ‘quite substantial beneﬁts—see ibid, col 612.
89ibid, col 615. The Solicitor-General said: ‘If a person cannot possibly foresee a situation, it cannot be
reasonably regarded as being likely to give rise to a conﬂict of interest. On the other hand, if they
can foresee it, the director or members of the company should be able to make an informed decision
about whether it is an acceptable conﬂict of interest or whether the matter should be dealt with in
accordance with applicable provisions under the company’s constitution.’
90See supra discussion at n 69.
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However, as Gower points out,91 this may leave a director in a difﬁcult pos-
ition: ﬁrst, she will have to assess whether acceptance of a second directorship
could ‘reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conﬂict of interest’,92
and, if it does, she will need authorisation from the non-conﬂicted members of
the board (or other authority from the company) before she can take it on.
Then, if the situation changes and the possibility of a conﬂict becomes an
actual conﬂict, or the facts otherwise change from those provided to the
board initially, it seems likely that a further authorisation would be needed
for the new ’situation’ in which the director now ﬁnds herself. In practice, it
may be likely that a director will want to get prior authorisation in any
event, or at least to make full disclosure to the board, in case a conﬂict
does later arise and it is argued that this was a foreseeable outcome.
Section B: the problem for NEDs
Notwithstanding the (theoretically) more relaxed post-2006 Act formulation,93
which as I have argued would look for the existence of an actual or likely con-
ﬂict before holding a director liable for a breach of section 175, the law will still
pose a signiﬁcant practical problem for many non-executive directors. It is
often expected that an NED will have outside interests;94 indeed, these may
be at the heart of the value that they can add. Their networks, current com-
mercial experience and ability to maintain ﬁnancial independence are often
key qualiﬁcations for the job.95 Those other responsibilities are likely to lead
them to ﬁnd other investment opportunities (or ‘information or property’,
which are also speciﬁcally mentioned in section 175). In many cases, they
may even be employed by another company speciﬁcally to identify other
investment opportunities, as would be commonly the case with an NED
appointed by a private equity shareholder. And a business angel investor,
who may well sit on the board of the company in which she has invested,
is unlikely to constrain herself to one investment. Indeed, in writing about
the position in the US, it has been observed that ‘conﬂicts of interest are
endemic to the commercial setting that the corporation calls home’.96
91PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) 16-169.
92Companies Act 2006, s 175(4).
93It may be theoretical because, as discussed above, in practice, most of the decided cases on corporate
opportunities were ones where a ‘conﬂict’ could be identiﬁed.
94See supra discussion at n 73.
95For example, the 11 ‘independent non-executive directors’ listed on the website of BP plc on 28 October
2014 had a total of 17 other commercial directorships or supervisory board memberships, and one was a
‘senior advisor’ to a leading private equity fund management company. These were in addition to
various government and industry appointments and academic posts.
96JD Cox, ‘Managing and Monitoring Conﬂicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside Directors With Inde-
pendent Counsel’ (2003) 48 Villanova Law Review 1077, 1079 (cited by A Keay, ‘The Authorising of Direc-
tors’ Conﬂicts of Interest: Getting A Balance?’ (2012) 12(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 129, 132).
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The fact that the law now appears to restrict the scope of the corporate
opportunities doctrine to cases of conﬂict is unlikely to provide much
comfort to most NEDs; indeed, they might be more likely to recognise
when an opportunity arises ‘by reason’ of their directorship, than to recognise
when one puts them in a position of legal conﬂict, and may regard the
company as having a more legitimate claim to the former than the latter.
Many investors, whether individual or institutional, will focus on a particular
sector in which they have special expertise. That means that any opportunities
they do discover are quite likely to be of interest to the company on whose
board they sit, and so give rise to the type of conﬂict dealt with by section
175. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that—even if the courts are
willing to have any regard to a company’s existing scope of business—the
cases discussed above demonstrate that they will (and, from a policy point
of view, should) still interpret the company’s interests expansively. And
even existing board resolutions constraining further investment, or consti-
tutional bars to an acquisition, are likely to be ignored by the courts if they
could be overturned by directors or shareholders (unless, perhaps, following
Wilkinson, the director herself could block exploitation of the opportunity
by the company in a non-ﬁduciary capacity—which may be the case for a
business angel, but would be rare otherwise).97
So the NED appointed to a company’s board might feel that a conﬂict of
the type outlawed by section 175 is quite likely to arise. She might,
however, look to statutory authorisation mechanisms, and to the Articles
themselves, for some comfort that these situations will be manageable. I
shall now consider those mechanisms in turn.
1. Independent directors’ authorisation
Section 175(4)(b), in an important departure from the common law, provides
that the duty to avoid conﬂicts of interests is not infringed if the matter has
been authorised by the directors.98 Section 175(5) states that a private
company needs no provision in its constitution to enable directors to author-
ise a conﬂict; they may do so unless the constitution says otherwise. Public
companies, on the other hand, must include speciﬁc authority in their Articles.
97Those charged with advising the UK government on what became the 2006 Companies Act recognised
this problem, and suggested abandoning the no-conﬂicts approach in favour of something more akin to
the no-proﬁts approach, but their advice did not ultimately prevail. Their suggested approach (which
would have been similar in effect to that applied by the Delaware courts), while not entirely solving
this problem, would have alleviated it. See Modern Company Law: Final Report, Annex C (June 2001),
and D Kershaw, ‘Does it Matter How the Law Thinks About Corporate Opportunities?’ 25(4) Legal
Studies 533 for a critical evaluation of the proposal.
98For a detailed analysis of this new approval mechanism and the reasons why it might not give rise to
optimum results for shareholders, see A Keay, ‘The Authorising of Directors’ Conﬂicts of Interest: Getting
A Balance?’ (2012) 12(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 129; B Hannigan, Company Law (3rd edn,
Oxford University Press 2012) 245.
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Section 175(6) makes it clear that the director who has the conﬂict, and any
other ‘interested’ directors, may not be counted in the quorum for the direc-
tors’ meeting, and any vote has to be passed by the disinterested directors
alone.
This provision could be used to authorise a director to take an investment
opportunity personally (or for the beneﬁt of some other person), when to do
so would otherwise have been a breach of section 175. However, there are
several problems with this apparent solution. First, it seems likely that full
information as to the nature of the actual or proposed conﬂict would have
to be provided to the disinterested directors, and therefore that any author-
isation could only cover such potential or actual conﬂicts as are known at
the time the authorisation is given. This is not just because, as a practical
matter, directors are unlikely to authorise a speciﬁc opportunity without
being told what it is, but also because the courts might well invalidate any
consent if it was not given on a fully informed basis. For example, in the
case of Gwembe Valley Development Company Ltd and another v Koshy and
others99 (where the courts were dealing with the common law requirement
to make disclosure to shareholders in order to avoid a duty to account for
an unauthorised proﬁt), Mummery LJ said:
Disclosure requirements are not conﬁned to the nature of the director’s interest:
they extend to disclosure of its extent, including the source and scale of the
proﬁt made from his position, so as to ensure that the shareholders are ‘fully
informed of the real state of things,’ as Lord Radcliffe said in Gray v. New Augar-
ita Porcupine Mines [1952] 3 DLR 1 at 14.
A similar approach was taken (in a case dealing with disclosure of interests
under a company’s articles) in Neptune v Fitzgerald,100 where Lightman J said:
The requirement is for a full and frank declaration by the director, not of ‘an’
interest, but of the precise nature of the interest he holds, and, when his
claim to the validity of a contract or arrangement depends upon it, he must
show that he has in letter and spirit complied with the section and any article
to like effect (see Lord Cairns in Liquidator of Imperial Mercantile Credit Associ-
ation v Coleman (1873) LR 6 HL 189 at 205).
This would imply that the directors may authorise the potential conﬂict that
arises by virtue of a director owing duties to speciﬁed third parties, but
there must be considerable doubt as to whether the board could validly
pre-authorise the director to take personally any investment opportunity of
which he becomes aware in the future.101
99[2003] All ER (D) 465 (Jul) [65]. See also Dunne v English [1874] LR18 Eq524.
100Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald [1995] 1 BCLC 352.
101See also A Keay, ‘The Authorising of Directors’ Conﬂicts of Interest: Getting A Balance?’ (2012) 12(1)
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 129, who says: ‘Naturally, any authorisation by the directors must be
on a properly informed basis’ (134).
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A somewhat similar situation was recently considered by the Court of
Appeal in Sharma v Sharma,102 another case dealing with shareholder
consent, in which Jackson LJ conﬁrmed that, in order for a beneﬁciary’s
consent to be effective, the ﬁduciary must have disclosed all material facts.
In that case, it was held that the director had discharged that obligation by
making it plain that she would acquire some dental practices in her own
name, even though not all of the details of any such purchases been identiﬁed
at that point. Jackson LJ therefore conﬁrmed that there were limits to the duty
of full disclosure, but that sufﬁciently speciﬁc information had to be provided
to allow an informed decision.
It therefore seems likely that, if no particular opportunities are in contem-
plation at the time of authorisation of a general conﬂict, a further, speciﬁc
authorisation would be needed to authorise a speciﬁc situation, so that the
directors could take into account the new information that was now relevant
to their decision. That might be commercially unacceptable for a director, who
would surely be concerned that an opportunistic board might seek to take the
(future, as yet unknown) opportunity for itself by refusing the speciﬁc author-
isation that is subsequently sought.
Second, in authorising a conﬂict, the directors must take account of the fact
that they themselves owe duties to the company—most notably, perhaps, the
duty to act in the way that they consider, in good faith, would be most likely to
promote the success of the company for the beneﬁt of its members as a
whole103 —and the disinterested directors might take the view that it is not
for the beneﬁt of the members as a whole to authorise a director to take a
speciﬁc proﬁtable opportunity that the company would itself like to take for
personal beneﬁt, or to pre-authorise opportunities more generally. They
may, therefore, be reluctant to use this power to authorise these types of con-
ﬂicts of interest.104
Third, authorisation by the directors would not be available where all direc-
tors face a similar conﬂict, or where there are not enoughdisinterested directors
to constitute a quorum.105 Thismaybe the case in aprivate equity situation if the
board is solely or mostly comprised of private equity appointees.106
102[2013] EWCA Civ 1287.
103Companies Act 2006, s 172.
104The objections to a general directors’ authorisation are most likely to be based on their own duties to
the company. While it is clear that board actions that fetter future discretion are permitted (see Fulham
Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc [1992] BCC 863), the directors would need to be satisﬁed that a
general waiver was in the best interests of the company, and without speciﬁc information, they
would be well advised to consider very carefully whether that would be the case. See further PL
Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies:Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) 16-169.
105s 175(6)(a) states that neither the conﬂicted director nor ‘any other interested director’ can be counted
in the quorum.
106In such a case, it may be possible to arrange authorisation by the shareholders, but that might pose
challenges of its own—see Section 2.2 below.
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Fourth, even in cases where the directors would be willing to authorise a
speciﬁc opportunity that a director puts to the board, this authorisation mech-
anism only works if the director is at liberty to make disclosure of the details of
the opportunity to the rest of the board. That may not be possible if the
opportunity came to the attention of the director while acting in a separate
capacity, in which case she is likely to be subject to conﬁdentiality restrictions
on what can be disclosed to others.107
2. Authorisation by the shareholders
Section 180(4)(a) says that the general duties of directors (which would
include the duty to avoid conﬂicts)108 ‘have effect, subject to any rule of
law enabling the company to give authority, speciﬁcally or generally, for
anything to be done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them, that
would otherwise be a breach of duty’. This section therefore preserves
the common law position that enables shareholders to pre-authorise an
act or omission that would otherwise not be duty-compliant. This is true
even though section 232(1) of the Act renders void any provision that ‘pur-
ports to exempt a director … from any liability that would otherwise
attach to him in connection with any … breach of duty’. Section 232(1)
must be read subject to section 180(4)(a), so that common law pre-
breach authorisations are an exception to the general prohibition on
exemptions.
The problem with the approach taken by the Act is that the common law
position on pre-breach authorisation is far from satisfactory.109 In particular, it
seems clear from the common law that not all breaches are capable of auth-
orisation by the shareholders, unless perhaps approval is given unani-
mously,110 and it is also unclear whether anyone could authorise a breach
when the company is on the verge of insolvency (but before an insolvency
ofﬁce-holder has been appointed), even if it would be in the company’s inter-
ests for such an approval to be given.111
107If, for example, a director acquired knowledge of the opportunity while acting as an employee or direc-
tor of another company, it is likely that she would be under a common law, contractual and/or company
law duty to keep it conﬁdential and/or use that information for the beneﬁt of that other company. See
e.g. the standard form service agreement for an executive director, Encyclopaedia of Forms and Pre-
cedents (Lexis Nexis Butterworths) vol 14(1)(a), cl 14.
108See Companies Act 2006, s 170(1), which refers to the ‘general duties’ speciﬁed in Sections 171–77 of
the Act.
109PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) ch 16.
110See e.g. Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation and Others [1986] Ch 246, where
Slade LJ said: ‘the clear general principle is that any act that falls within the corporate capacity of a
company will bind it if it is done with the unanimous consents of all the shareholders or is subsequently
ratiﬁed by such consents’ (296).
111See the judgment of Street CJ in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722, 730,
approved by Dillon LJ in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd and another [1988] BCLC 250, 252.
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The general proposition (which applies to both authorisations and ratiﬁca-
tions) is often stated to be that ‘a majority of the shareholders may not by resol-
ution expropriate to themselves company property, because the property of the
company is something inwhich all the shareholders of the company have a (pro
rata) interest’.112 In Cook v Deeks113 that rule was applied to contracts that the
directors had diverted to themselves instead of entering into in the name of
the company, and the court said that the shareholders should not be able to
make a ‘present to themselves’. And although in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver114
Lord Russell said that directors would not be liable to account for proﬁts if their
acquisition of shares had been approved ‘by a resolution (either antecedent or
subsequent) of the Regal shareholders in general meeting’, commentators
have pointed out that in Regal, the directors made no attempt to damage the
company to the detriment of the minority and, indeed, acted in a way that
they thought would beneﬁt the company, or at least that was the assumption
the court made.115 Therefore the validity of any authorisation resolution might
depend upon whether it was designed to deprive the company of a valuable
business opportunity in favour of the majority shareholders, which, of course,
it might well be, particularly in the case of a private equity-backed company.
But even if shareholders were able to authorise a speciﬁc opportunity,
similar problems will arise as discussed above with regard to board approval.
First, any authorisation that is given would need to be speciﬁc enough to
cover the actual situation that arises.116 This means that the efﬁcacy of a
general authority would be open to doubt.
Second, the precise circumstances of the conﬂict may be conﬁdential and
commercially sensitive, and the director may be under a duty not to disclose
those circumstances to the company or its (unrelated) shareholders. In such a
case, it may be impossible to formulate a sufﬁciently speciﬁc resolution to
cover the conﬂict.
Finally, as with board approval, the NED is unlikely to be able to take the
risk that the shareholders will decline to authorise any speciﬁc opportunity,
with the result that she is unable to exploit the opportunity for herself or
for another party to whom she may owe duties, and approval may not
even be practical in the case of a listed company or one with many widely-dis-
persed shareholders. It therefore seems unlikely that shareholder approval will
generally be a viable mechanism for approving corporate opportunity
conﬂicts.
112PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) 16-196.
113[1916] 1 AC 554, PC.
114[1942] 1 All ER 378, 389.
115See e.g. D Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 654.
116It seems that a general waiver of duty would fall foul of s 232(1) of the Act. Also see Gwembe Valley
Development Company Ltd and another v Koshy and others [2003] EWCA Civ 1048; All ER (D) 465 (Jul).
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3. Authorisation by the Articles
In Sections A and B, I have described the current state of the law on cor-
porate opportunities, and argued that the 2006 Act narrowed the scope of
the prohibition somewhat (at least in theory) by making it clear that the
rule will not apply unless there is a conﬂict, effectively abolishing any sep-
arate no-proﬁt rule whose application did not rely on there being a conﬂict.
I have nevertheless suggested that the law on corporate opportunities does
pose an ongoing problem for directors, especially part-time ones, and that
the various common law and statutory authorisation mechanisms that exist
will frequently not solve the problem. In light of this, the part-time NED
might hope that the Articles of Association will come to her aid and,
indeed, provisions that deal with conﬂicts of interest are, in fact, commonly
included in a company’s constitution. In the next section of this article I will
examine how Articles of Association tackle this problem in practice.
Section C: what do Articles provide in practice?
In order to understand the ways in which listed UK companies legislate for
corporate opportunities discovered by their non-executive directors, I have
analysed the Articles of the 30 largest listed UK companies.117 Not surprisingly,
this analysis revealed many striking similarities between the Articles of the
companies concerned, covering similar territory and in many cases adopting
identical (or near-identical) wording.118
1. General provisions on conﬂicts of interest
All 30 of the companies whose Articles I analysed gave the board of direc-
tors a general power to authorise a director’s conﬂict of interest, taking
advantage of the provisions of section 175, which allow such an authoris-
ation when, in the case of a public company, there is a speciﬁc enabling
provision in the company’s constitution. That is noteworthy it itself, given
117During August and September 2014, I analysed conﬂict of interest provisions in the following compa-
nies: Anglo American plc, AstraZeneca plc, Aviva plc, BAE Systems plc, Barclays plc, BG Group plc, BHP
Billiton plc, BP plc, British American Tobacco plc, BT Group plc, Centrica plc, Compass Group plc, Diageo
plc, GlaxoSmithKline plc, HSBC Holdings plc, Imperial Tobacco Group plc, Legal & General Group plc,
Lloyds Banking Group plc, National Grid plc, Prudential plc, Reckitt Benckiser Group plc, Rio Tinto plc,
Rolls-Royce Holdings plc, Royal Dutch Shell plc, SABMiller plc, Scottish and Southern Energy plc, Stan-
dard Chartered plc, Tesco plc, Unilever plc and Vodafone Group plc. These were selected because they
were the largest 30 companies in the FTSE 100 by market capitalisation as at 19 August 2014, excluding
the 3 that are not UK incorporated (Glencore plc, Shire plc and WPP plc).
118Some of the wording used is itself taken from the 2006 Act’s Model Articles or the model Articles (Table
A) established by previous Companies Acts, while much of it is taken from a publication entitled GC100
Companies Act 2006—Directors’ conﬂicts of interest (8 January 2008), referred to at n 122 below. It also
seems likely that companies using a common law ﬁrm as their corporate advisers will tend to show
greater similarity in their Articles, but this hypothesis was not tested in my analysis.
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that the DTI decided against including the power in the Model Articles for
public companies on the basis that it would be appropriate for each public
company to decide whether it wants to confer such a power on its direc-
tors.119 It seems that the top 30 companies were unanimous in their
decision.
There is considerable variety in the wording employed by the 30 compa-
nies, but all give the directors a wide-ranging power to the full extent per-
mitted by the Act, and some track the wording of the Act quite precisely in
doing so. So, for example, the Articles of Rio Tinto plc state that:
For the purposes of Section 175 of the Companies Act 2006, the Directors
shall have the power to authorise any matter which would or might other-
wise constitute or give rise to a breach of the duty of a Director under that
Section to avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect
interest that conﬂicts, or possibly may conﬂict, with the interests of the
Company.
Or, more simply, the Articles of GlaxoSmithKline plc say:
The board may, subject to the quorum and voting requirements set out in this
article, authorise any matter which would otherwise involve a director breaching
his duty under the Companies Acts to avoid conﬂicts of interest.
In all cases, these general enabling provisions would appear to allow the
board to authorise a director to take a speciﬁc corporate opportunity
that arises. However, as discussed above, it seems likely that, as a matter
of general corporate law, any relevant opportunity would have to be
taken to the board and enough details given to the independent directors
to enable them to make a decision as to whether to authorise the particu-
lar opportunity (and, in doing so, the independent directors would have to
be cognisant of their own duties, in particular the duty to promote the
success of the company). As argued above, corporate opportunities
would require such authorisation if they were within the scope of the com-
pany’s business (interpreted widely by the courts or perhaps even regarded
as all-encompassing), and the company’s capacity to take the opportunity
is irrelevant (save, perhaps, in extreme cases such as where the director is
also a shareholder with the right to veto the company taking the
opportunity).
Although such a procedure may be workable in some situations, in the vast
majority of cases this position seems untenable for the real world NED, for the
reasons given above. Even if she were permitted to make full disclosure of an
opportunity discovered while she was acting on behalf of someone else, she
119See Implementation of Companies Act 2006: A Consultative Document, para 3.76: http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121029131934/, http://www.bis.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle37974.pdf accessed 4 Sep-
tember 2015.
170 S. WITNEY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
04
:01
 15
 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
would not be able to rely on the board being willing to authorise it in a speciﬁc
case.
2. Outside directorships and other ofﬁces or employment
As discussed in Section A5 above, many NEDs will sit on the board of more
than one company, and may need (or prefer to have) authorisation to do so
by reason of section 175. It is, of course, possible for a company’s Articles
speciﬁcally to allow a director to take on outside directorships or other
appointments, or to permit the board to authorise a director to take on
outside appointments. Of the 30 sets of Articles I analysed, 13 (43%) made
such an explicit provision and the remaining 17 (57%) were silent (see
Figure 1). However, in all cases, the general ability to authorise conﬂicts of
interest (or potential conﬂicts of interest) referred to above would in any
event be wide enough to permit the board to authorise an outside appoint-
ment. As expected,120 no company in my sample included an absolute prohi-
bition on outside appointments.
Of the 13 instances where speciﬁc provision is made, only 3 (10% of the
total) give the board an unconditional power to authorise outside appoint-
ments (as opposed to appointments with group companies), and these also
give the board power to further specify how conﬂicts of interest arising out
of such an appointment should be dealt with. The wording used in these 3
cases is similar, with a typical Article being that used by British American
Tobacco:
The directors may (subject to such terms and conditions, if any, as they may
think ﬁt to impose from time to time, and subject always to their right to vary
or terminate such authorisation) authorise, to the fullest extent permitted by
law… (b) a director to accept or continue in any ofﬁce, employment or position
Figure 1. Capacity authorisation in listed company Articles.
120See supra discussion at n 71.
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in addition to his ofﬁce as a director of the Company and, without prejudice to
the generality of paragraph (1)(a) of this article, may authorise the manner in
which a conﬂict of interest arising out of such ofﬁce, employment or position
may be dealt with, either before or at the time that such a conﬂict of interest
arises…
The 10 remaining companies that speciﬁcally contemplate outside appoint-
ments merely provide that the director is allowed to take them on, provided
she has declared her interest and there is no immediate conﬂict. The relevant
Article used by GlaxoSmithKline is typical and stipulates that:
Provided he has declared his interest in accordance with paragraph (A), a direc-
tor may:… be or become a director of any other company in which the
company does not have an interest and which cannot reasonably be regarded
as giving rise to a conﬂict of interest at the time of his appointment as a director
of that other company.
The effect of such a provision would appear to be that a director does not
need special permission to take on an outside appointment, even if that
outside appointment may give rise to a potential conﬂict of interest in
the future, provided that there is no actual conﬂict of interest at the
time she takes it on and it is fully disclosed.121 In contrast, it may be
assumed that an outside appointment of a director of a company
without such a provision would need approval if it can reasonably be
regarded as likely that such an appointment might give rise to a conﬂict
in the future, which is the position set out in section 175(4) of the Act,
as discussed above.
Although these 13 companies contemplate outside appointments, none
deals speciﬁcally with future corporate opportunities arising from that
appointment. It may be that, in the case of those 3 that give the board
power to specify how conﬂicts that arise out of an appointment should be
dealt with, the board could stipulate that any corporate opportunities that
arise to the director when acting in her outside capacity do not need to be
offered to the company, but (as discussed above) the directors might ﬁnd it
hard to square such a blanket waiver of opportunities with their own
duties, particularly without a more speciﬁc authority to do so from the
shareholders.
121However, there may be some debate as to whether, if circumstances change and an actual conﬂict
arises, a further and speciﬁc authorisation would be required. The question would arise as to the
precise scope of the authorisation and, if it was too broad, whether it would be consistent with s
232. This question was discussed in the House of Lords Grand Committee debate on this section, and
Lord Goldsmith argued that it may well be that authorisation given to one director to take a non-execu-
tive post in another company could be capable of covering any conﬂicting interest or duty that sub-
sequently arose as a result of that other appointment (HL Deb, 9 February 2006, vol 678, col GC323).
However, the government subsequently rejected an amendment tabled by the opposition that
would have allowed a ‘general’ authorisation to be given on the basis that the board may not have
enough information to make an ‘informed’ decision.
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3. Conﬁdentiality
As mentioned above, one problem for the NED who discovers a corporate
opportunity while working on behalf of someone else (perhaps as an
employee or director of another company) is that she may owe duties of con-
ﬁdentiality to that other person and may not be in a position to make full dis-
closure to the board. The NED might take comfort from the fact that all 30
companies whose Articles I analysed include a provision protecting a director
from an obligation to disclose information to the company, or to use it for the
company’s beneﬁt, in circumstances where they owe a duty of conﬁdentiality
to a third party.122 However, in all cases, the provision is conditional. In 13
(43%) of the Articles surveyed, waiver of the requirement to disclose conﬁden-
tial information to the company only applies if, in the course of approving a
conﬂict or a speciﬁc outside appointment, the board stipulates that such a
waiver shall apply. The Articles of Royal Dutch Shell plc are typical of this
type of provision:
Where the board gives authority in relation to a Conﬂict or where any of the
situations described in paragraph (F) applies in relation to a director… the
board may also provide that where the relevant director obtains (otherwise
than through his position as a director of the company) information that is
conﬁdential to a third party, the director will not be obliged to disclose
that information to the company, or to use or apply the information in
relation to the company’s affairs, where to do so would amount to a
breach of that conﬁdence…
Therefore, assuming that a waiver is given to a director having a separate
capacity that creates an actual or potential conﬂict, and that the board resol-
ution takes advantage of this additional board power, the NED will be pro-
tected from a general duty to disclose the information to the company or
to use it for the company’s affairs.
In the remaining 17 (57%) of cases, the waiver of conﬁdentiality does not
itself require speciﬁc board approval but follows automatically once a
matter or an outside appointment has been approved by the board. This is
achieved in two slightly different ways. Four of the surveyed companies
waive conﬁdentiality only in relation to matters or appointments that have
been approved; however, most of them (13 of the 17) give a general waiver
where the director is under a duty of conﬁdentiality to a third party but con-
dition that waiver so that, where the duty arises from a conﬂict situation, the
122Shortly after the 2006 Act became law there was some debate about how to deal with the new pro-
visions in Articles of Association and the Association of General Counsel and Company Secretaries of the
FTSE 100 published a paper entitled GC100 Companies Act 2006—Directors’ Conﬂicts of Interest (8
January 2008), cited in A Keay, Directors’ Duties (2nd edn, Jordans 2014) 283, n 112. This paper has
been used as the basis for the drafting of many of the Articles now found in the Articles of the companies
considered in this Article, including those dealing with conﬁdentiality, which seek to make use of s 180
(4)(b).
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waiver will only apply if the conﬂict or potential conﬂict has itself been auth-
orised. The British American Tobacco Articles are typical of the ﬁrst type of
provision:
If a matter, or ofﬁce, employment or position, has been authorised by the direc-
tors in accordance with this article then (subject to such terms and conditions, if
any, as the directors may think ﬁt to impose from time to time, and subject
always to their right to vary or terminate such authorisation or the permissions
set out below):… the director shall not be required to disclose to the Company,
or use in performing his duties as a director of the Company, any conﬁdential
information relating to such matter, or such ofﬁce, employment or position if
to make such a disclosure or use would result in a breach of a duty or obligation
of conﬁdence owed by him in relation to or in connection with that matter, or
that ofﬁce, employment or position;
The HSBC Articles are typical of the second type of provision:
136.1 Subject to Article 136.2, a Director shall be under no duty to the
Company with respect to any information which he obtains or has obtained
otherwise than as a Director of the Company and in respect of which he has a
duty of conﬁdentiality to another person. In particular, the Director shall not
be in breach of the general duties he owes to the Company under the Act
because he fails to: (a) disclose any such information to the Board or to
any Director or other ofﬁcer or employee of the Company; and/or (b) use
or apply any such information in performing his duties as a Director of the
Company.
136.2 To the extent that the relationship between a Director and a person to
whom he owes a duty of conﬁdentiality gives rise to a conﬂict of interest or
possible conﬂict of interest, Article 136.1 applies only if the existence of that
relationship has been authorised by the Board pursuant to Article 134 or if
Article 133 applies to the relationship.
However, in all 30 cases, the conﬁdentiality waiver would not seem to extend
to a permission to take advantage of a corporate opportunity without further
authorisation and approval. They provide that there is no obligation to use the
information for the company’s beneﬁt, but do not give express permission to
use it for anyone else’s. The lack of any such express waiver would be particu-
larly troubling where the opportunity created a position of conﬂict, such as a
case in which the company might want to take advantage of the opportunity
itself if it were given the chance to do so.
Directors might also be troubled that the enforceability of even these more
limited waivers of conﬁdentiality may be open to some doubt. It seems clear
from several cases dealing with both conﬂicts of interest and the duty to act in
the best interests of the company (which is now the section 172 duty to
promote success) that directors are under a positive duty to make disclosure
of information that it would be in the interests of the company to know, and it
does not appear to matter whether or not the relevant information was
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obtained in the course of acting as a director: in both Bhullar123 and IDC v
Cooley,124 the director was under a duty to disclose information relating to
a corporate opportunity and, in a slightly different context, a director has
been held to be under an obligation to disclose his own misconduct. The
latter ﬁnding was held by Arden LJ not to establish an independent duty to
disclose, but to be an aspect of the fundamental duty of loyalty.125 It therefore
seems clear that a duty to disclose relevant information forms part of the
panoply of directors’ duties. That being so, a provision in a company’s Articles
that waives that duty must be tested against section 232(1) of the Companies
Act, as it would seem that it ‘purports to exempt a director of a company…
from any liability that would otherwise attach to him in connection with any
negligence, default, breach of duty’.
There are two possible arguments in favour of enforceability of these pro-
visions. First, section 232 goes on to provide126 that provisions in a company’s
articles dealing with ‘conﬂicts of interest’ that were previously lawful can con-
tinue to be used, despite the wording of section 232(1). However, it is far from
clear whether a complete exemption from conﬁdentiality was ‘previously
lawful’, and such a blanket exemption has never been included in the
default Articles set out in previous Companies Acts.
The second, and superﬁcially more attractive argument, is that section 180
(4)(b) speciﬁcally provides that the general duties are not infringed by ‘any-
thing done (or omitted) by the directors, or any of them’ in accordance
with ‘provisions for dealing with conﬂicts of interest’ in a company’s Articles.
This provision would seem to apply to waivers of disclosure of conﬁdential
information, which would give rise to a conﬂict. However, there is academic
support for the view that section 180(4), like section 232(4), should also be
bounded by what was previously lawful, given the apparent conﬂict with
section 232, and the circumstances in which the section was introduced
into the Companies Act.127 There does not seem to be any clear authority
for the proposition that a provision allowing a director to withhold conﬁden-
tial information that would be valuable to the company was lawful.
If that view is correct, then we would have to ﬁnd an alternative reason to
suppose that directors are entitled to maintain the conﬁdentiality of infor-
mation that they receive in a separate capacity. It would not be commercially
123[2003] EWCA Civ 424. See also D Prentice and J Payne, ‘The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine’ (2004) 120
Law Quarterly Review 198.
124[1972] 2 All ER 162.
125See Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] EWCA Civ 1244. This decision is applied by Newey J in GHLM
Trading Ltd v Maroo and others [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch) 192–95, who says that a director’s duty of loyalty
requires him to disclose information if he subjectively concludes that to do so would be in the best inter-
ests of the company.
126s 232(4).
127PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower & Davies: Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2012) 16-201ff.
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viable to have part-time directors on boards with any outside interests at all
unless some basis could be found to allow them to respect the conﬁdentiality
of information obtained in a separate capacity. I shall argue in Section D of this
article that such a basis does exist.
4. Duty to account for beneﬁts
Another provision included in 28 of the 30 sets of Articles of the companies
surveyed (the exceptions being HSBC and BHP Billiton)128 expressly permits
a director to keep ‘beneﬁts’ arising from authorised conﬂicts or outside
appointments. In each case, the source of the beneﬁt or the relationship
giving rise to it must itself have been disclosed or authorised (as appropriate).
The Articles deal with this situation in a variety of ways, but the provision in
the Vodafone Articles is a typical example:
Subject to any conditions or limitations imposed under Article 100.4, a director
shall not, save as otherwise agreed by him, be accountable to the Company for
any beneﬁt which he (or a person connected with him) derives from any matter
authorised by the directors under Article 100.1 and any contract, transaction,
arrangement or proposal relating thereto shall not be liable to be avoided on
the grounds of any such beneﬁt.129
The wording used in these Articles is similar to the wording of section 176 of
the 2006 Act, which says that a director ‘must not accept a beneﬁt from a third
party conferred by reason of (a) his being a director or (b) his doing (or not
doing) anything as a director’. Although it has been suggested that this is a
codiﬁcation of the ‘no-proﬁt rule’, as discussed above,130 the prevailing con-
sensus is that section 176 is in fact a re-statement of the common law prohibi-
tion on ‘bribes’. In any event, section 176 is only dealing with beneﬁts derived
from (or in some way arising out of) the directorship, while this Article is
clearly aimed at beneﬁts that are unrelated to the director’s position as a
director, but that are related to an outside appointment or conﬂict situation,
which has itself been authorised. In eleven of these 28 sets of Articles, the per-
mission is in fact speciﬁcally extended to cover ‘proﬁts’ as well as ‘beneﬁts’.
It is possible that this Article is intended by the companies concerned to
deal with the situation where a corporate opportunity arises, and that oppor-
tunity places the director in a position of conﬂict because the opportunity is
one that the company might be interested in pursuing. However, in that case,
it seems likely that it is only designed to cover beneﬁts or proﬁts that arise
directly and foreseeably from the situation or appointment authorised. So,
128These companies do provide that there is no duty to account for certain types of interest, but not for
beneﬁts received from authorised conﬂict situations.
129The wording of these Articles follows closely the wording of Reg 85(c) of the Companies Regulations
(Tables A-F) Regulations 1985, on which it is clearly based.
130See supra discussion at n 36.
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for example, if a speciﬁc corporate opportunity were authorised by the direc-
tors, any proﬁt arising from it could be kept by the director, or if an outside
directorship were approved, any directors’ fees or other remuneration
would be covered. It seems unlikely that these Articles would be construed
to allow a director to exploit and keep the proﬁts from any proﬁtable corpor-
ate opportunity within the scope of the company’s business that she discovers
while operating in an (authorised) separate capacity. In any event, it is doubt-
ful whether any such broad exemption would be valid, given the restriction on
exemptions from liability in section 232.
In summary, all 30 sets of Articles permit boards to authorise actual or
potential conﬂicts of interest and, although only a minority speciﬁcally con-
template outside directorships or employment, the scope of the board’s auth-
ority is broad enough to allow such appointments to be authorised. For
authorised conﬂict situations, there are also waivers (in some cases automatic
and in others at the option of the board) of conﬁdentiality, and in most cases
the directors can be allowed to retain ‘beneﬁts’. However, none of these
Articles explicitly deals separately with corporate opportunities, and none
gives a clear and unconditional waiver of opportunities that arise to a director
while she is acting in a capacity other than as a director of the company
concerned.
Does this mean that a non-executive director of one of these companies,
who has been granted permission by the board to also act on behalf of a
third party, would have to offer an attractive investment opportunity discov-
ered while acting in that separate capacity to the company, assuming that the
company might have an interest in it? In the absence of a speciﬁc board
approval of the conﬂict arising out of the opportunity, would the director
face sanctions for breach of section 175 (or indeed other duties, such as the
duty of loyalty)? If so, it would increase the risks for NEDs, and could put a
director in a very difﬁcult situation.
I will argue in the next section of this article that, despite the absence of
speciﬁc provisions in the Articles, the law is not—or at least does not need
to be held by the courts to be—so draconian.
Section D: the boundaries of ﬁduciary duties
As we have seen, in practice Articles of Association do not generally try to
explicitly exempt directors from the obligation to seek speciﬁc approval for
corporate opportunities that they discover and wish to take personally or in
another capacity, and indeed I have argued that it is likely that blanket exemp-
tions of that nature in the Articles are likely to be ineffective: section 232’s
prohibition of exemptions from liability for breaches of duty (a provision
that was previously found in section 310 of the Companies Act 1985) limits
the generally contractarian approach of company law in this respect.
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Articles do, however, often acknowledge that directors may have other
directorships and roles, especially non-executive directors, and sometimes
these are contemplated and permitted by the Articles themselves, while
in other cases a separate directors’ approval is required for the potential
conﬂict that may ensue. Articles also typically say that the manner of res-
olution of any actual conﬂict that arises from any other position may be
determined by the directors either at the time it arises or before it
arises. They also purport to exempt the director from the requirement to
make disclosure of any conﬁdential information relating to any approved
position (or ‘capacity’) if to do so would be a breach of an obligation to
maintain conﬁdentiality, although (as discussed above) the enforceability
of such a provision may be open to doubt. They often also exempt direc-
tors from an obligation to account for ‘beneﬁts’ received from an author-
ised position.
It is submitted that explicit disclosure and, in appropriate cases, authoris-
ation of potential conﬂicts arising from other capacities (or outside appoint-
ments and duties) has wider consequences: it is part of the factual matrix
that helps to deﬁne the scope of a director’s ﬁduciary duty to her company.
There is no need for a contractual exemption from a duty, which could be
called into question by section 232(1), if no duty exists in the ﬁrst place;
and the courts have always asserted that the existence and scope of a duty
depends on the speciﬁc circumstances.
1. When is a director not a ﬁduciary?
The starting point for an analysis of the bounded nature of ﬁduciary duties
owed by a director is the uncontroversial assertion that a company director,
whether full or part time, is not always in a ﬁduciary relationship with her
company, even when the Articles are silent on the question. Indeed, the
basic position in an owner-managed company is that the directors will not
be required to exercise their votes as shareholder in a way that is consistent
with their ﬁduciary duties as directors; they have separate ‘capacities’ and
are permitted to take their director’s hat off when sitting in the general
meeting. That position was re-stated by Warren J in Wilkinson v West
Coast Capital131and is clearly correct. It is also plain that directors may act
in a private capacity in managing their personal ﬁnancial affairs; for
example, when making personal pension arrangements, a company director
has no duty to offer any investment opportunity put to her by her pension
adviser to the company before she can invest personally.
The cases have also recognised other speciﬁc situations in which directors
do not owe duties to their company, or when those duties are curtailed in
131[2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch) esp [299].
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some way. For example, in CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet,132 Lawrence Collins J
held that a director’s power to resign was not a ﬁduciary power, and he
was entitled to resign ‘however damaging it may be to the interests of the
company’. In In Plus Group Limited v Pyke133 the Court of Appeal held that a
director who had been excluded from the company of which he was a director
did not commit a breach of ﬁduciary duty by competing with it. In each of
these cases, the court is not seeking to argue that there would have been
no breach of duty had a duty been owed—on the contrary, it is clear that
there would have been—but that the scope of the duty owed was narrowed
or eliminated by the circumstances. In In Plus Group, Sedley LJ said:
Quite exceptionally, the defendant’s duty to the claimants had been reduced to
vanishing point by the acts (explicable and even justiﬁable though they may
have been) of his sole fellow director and fellow shareholder… 134
The question is not, therefore, whether directors are always bound by all of
their ﬁduciary duties all of the time—it is clear that they are not—but
whether, in the particular circumstances that arise, they are bound by
any particular ﬁduciary duty and, if so, which one(s). No doubt, when
sitting around the boardroom table, they are bound by all duties, and
indeed that is the default position. However, there are circumstances
when that is not the case.
This proposition, that the scope of a duty differs according to the circum-
stances, ﬁnds widespread support in judicial summaries of the relevant prin-
ciples in the cases; indeed, it is hard to ﬁnd corporate opportunity cases in
which this point is not made. In Boardman v Phipps, Lord Upjohn made it
clear that rules of equity have to be applied ‘with particular attention to the
exact circumstances of each case’,135 a view echoed more recently in In Plus
Group Limited v Pyke,136 in which Brooke LJ (with whom Jonathan Parker LJ
agreed) said, ‘the facts and circumstances of each case must be carefully
examined to see whether a ﬁduciary relationship exists in relation to the
matter of which complaint is made’.
It is therefore necessary to examine more closely when the duty to avoid
conﬂicts arises, and the types of circumstances in which it can safely be
assumed not to apply.137
132[2001] 2 BCLC 704 [87].
133[2002] EWCA Civ 370. See in particular [89].
134[2002] EWCA Civ 370 [90].
135[1967] 2 AC 46, 123.
136[2002] EWCA Civ 370 [75].
137See also D Gibbs, ‘The Absolute Limit of Directors’ Fiduciary Liability for Conﬂicts of Interest: The Direc-
tor’s Perspective’ (2015) 36 The Company Lawyer 231, who argues that, in determining the scope of
directors’ duties, the courts should have regard to what the director has taken responsibility for.
However, this is only one of the relevant factors, because it is clear that a director cannot unilaterally
deﬁne the scope of her duty.
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2. Opportunities discovered by executive directors in their ’spare time’
It is well established that it is not necessarily an answer to a claim for breach
of the duty to avoid conﬂicts that the opportunity was discovered during a
director’s ’spare time’. Bhullar v Bhullar138 is clear authority for the prop-
osition that a director who discovers an opportunity while not wearing her
director’s hat will nevertheless be in breach of duty if she does not take
that opportunity to the company, and there is a conﬂict in pursuing it.
However, it is signiﬁcant that, in Bhullar, the directors had no other disclosed
business interests, and according to the judge ‘had, at the material time, one
capacity and one capacity only’.139 One of the key cases relied on by
Jonathan Parker LJ in reaching his conclusion was the decision of Roskill J
in Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley,140 and in that case the
director concerned was the managing director—a fact that is stressed in
the case itself and in the extracts Jonathan Parker LJ cites. Indeed, the phra-
seology used by Jonathan Parker LJ is borrowed from Roskill J, who says of
the defendant in IDC v Cooley:
[He] had one capacity and one capacity only in which he was carrying on
business at that time. That capacity was as managing director of the plaintiffs.141
So, although in both Bhullar and IDC v Cooley the relevant opportunities were
discovered by directors in their ’spare time’,142 it was clearly important that
they only had one ‘capacity’ (so far as the company was concerned), and
that the scope of the directors’ ﬁduciary duties had not been clearly deli-
neated by the company (either expressly or by necessary implication).
These cases do not establish that directors can only ever have one capacity,
but rather that these particular directors, on the facts before the court, only
had one capacity. The cases are not, therefore, determinative of a situation
in which a director does have more than one capacity that is known to the
company at the relevant time.
It is also clear from Bhullar that, although the no-conﬂict rule itself is said to
be an ‘inﬂexible’ one, its application is very fact-speciﬁc. Adopting the
approach of Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps referred to above,143 Jonathan
Parker LJ says that ‘ﬂexibility of application is of the essence of the rule’, and
the question is whether the ‘ﬁduciary’s exploitation of the opportunity is such
138[2003] EWCA Civ 424.
139It is also clear from the judgment of John Behrens QC in the High Court that the relevant directors were
employed to work for the business and were closely involved in the day-to-day running of the business.
See Bhullar v Bhullar (unreported) 2002 WL 1654842, 10 May 2002 esp [42]–[51].
140[1972] 2 All ER 162.
141[1972] 2 All ER 162 at 173.
142In IDC v Cooley the opportunity was not so much discovered in the director’s ‘spare time’, but rather it
was accepted in the case that the approach was made to him ‘in a personal capacity’ (in the sense that
the person making the approach did not intend that the company should take the opportunity).
143See supra n 135.
180 S. WITNEY
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
04
:01
 15
 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
as to attract the application of the rule’.144 In Bhullar the circumstances in
which the opportunity arose and the role that the director had with the
company dictated that the scope of the ﬁduciary duty was wide enough to
cover it; in other cases, the scope of the duty will be narrower.145
It is true that Lady Justice Arden in Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi and
others,146 having cited Bhullar and IDC v Cooley, said: ‘These authorities go
to show that the fact that a director was acting otherwise than as a director
in making a secret proﬁt is no answer to a claim by the company to recover
the proﬁts. ’ However, as noted above, the cited authorities for that prop-
osition are both cases where there had not been any clear acknowledgement
by the company (indeed, there had been no acknowledgement at all) that the
director was able to act otherwise than as a director at any time. In other
words, his duties were all-encompassing because no limits had been set by
the company. No other ‘capacity’ had been disclosed and agreed to by the
board or by the shareholders, and holding that the scope of the no-conﬂict
rule extends to opportunities discovered in their ’spare’ time for full-time
directors does not imply that the scope of the duty to avoid conﬂicts auto-
matically applies to part-time directors when they are acting in another
capacity. It is that scenario that I will now consider.
3. Opportunities discovered while acting in another ‘capacity’
As discussed in the second section of this article, part-time (or non-executive)
directors will often have other commercial interests, often including (but by
no means limited to) directorships of other companies. While these commer-
cial interests may not directly compete with those of the company, there will
often be a realistic chance that they will discover attractive business opportu-
nities in these other ‘capacities’ which, for the reasons explained above, they
may not be in a position to disclose to the company or to seek speciﬁc auth-
ority for personal exploitation.
This situation was considered in the Scottish case of Commonwealth Oil and
Gas Company Limited v Baxter and Eurasia Energy.147 In that case, it was
accepted that the director concerned was a director mainly for tax reasons,
and had no executive functions nor received any remuneration from
the company. It was also known to the company that he was pursuing invest-
ment opportunities in a personal capacity in a related or identical business
144[2003] EVCA Civ 424 [28].
145It is submitted that the outcome would have been different in Bhullar if the company’s Articles had said
that the defendants were allowed to act in a separate capacity outside of ofﬁce hours, and that oppor-
tunities discovered outside of ofﬁce hours did not need to be disclosed to the company, because the
circumstances, and therefore the scope of the duty, would have been different—see the discussion
at Section D3 below.
146[2004] EWCA Civ 1244 [38].
147[2009] CSIH 75.
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area.148 Nevertheless, the court held that the director had ﬁduciary duties and
that, in the circumstances of the case, he was in breach of those duties in
exploiting an opportunity for his personal beneﬁt rather than taking it to
the company. Both the Lord President and Lord Nimmo Smith refused to
accept the general proposition, advanced by counsel, that the duty to avoid
conﬂicts only arises when a director is acting in his capacity as a director.149
However, the reasoning in the case is instructive, and supports the view
that the scope of the duty to avoid conﬂicts will be determined by the circum-
stances in which the director ﬁnds herself. Having referred to comments made
by Rix LJ in Foster Bryant Surveying Limited v Bryant,150 who said that the
extent of a director’s duty ‘may depend on the circumstances’, the Lord Pre-
sident went on to assert as follows:
In the same way, if a director were to draw to the attention of his company a
particular commercial opportunity, whether in an embryonic or developed
state, and to obtain the company’s consent to pursue that opportunity on his
own personal behalf, his duty to avoid a possible conﬂict of interest would
not extend to that opportunity. Similarly, it seems to me that if, without the
identiﬁcation of any particular opportunity, the company, expressly or implicitly,
were to give its prior consent to a director pursuing possibly competing inter-
ests, his duty would not extend to avoiding such conﬂicts. If, for example, in
the present case agreement had been reached between Mr Baxter and
COGCL that some opportunities (say, any onshore) would be brought to
COGCL but that others (say, offshore) could be exploited by Mr Baxter for his
own interest and beneﬁt, the scope of Mr Baxter’s duties would have beenmodi-
ﬁed by that arrangement. Even without express agreement, the actings of
parties could in some circumstances have given rise to a modiﬁcation of Mr
Baxter’s duties.
Lord Nimmo Smith makes similar comments, and refers to the duty to avoid
conﬂicts being avoidable with ‘informed consent’. He seems to agree with the
Lord President that it would be possible to vary the scope of the duty owed by
the director in a general way, rather than requiring a speciﬁc corporate oppor-
tunity to be put to the board. This would not mean that there would be no
conﬂict in relation to a particular opportunity, but that the duty to avoid con-
ﬂicts would not apply to it.151
Lord Browne-Wilkinson emphasises these points in Henderson v Merrett
Syndicates:152
The phrase ‘ﬁduciary duties’ is a dangerous one, giving rise to a mistaken
assumption that all ﬁduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances. That
148See The Opinion of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Reed, at ﬁrst instance, whose extensive description of the
factual background was approved on appeal: [2007] CSOH 198, in particular at [59].
149[2009] CSIH 75 at [11] and [79].
150[2007] 2 BCLC 239.
151[2009] CSIH 75 [80].
152[1995] 2 AC 145, 206.
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is not the case. Although, so far as I am aware, every ﬁduciary is under a duty not
to make a proﬁt from his position (unless such proﬁt is authorised), the ﬁduciary
duties owed, for example, by an express trustee are not the same as those owed
by an agent. Moreover, and more relevantly, the extent and nature of the ﬁdu-
ciary duties owed in any particular case fall to be determined by reference to any
underlying contractual relationship between the parties.
While section 232(1) of the 2006 Act153 makes it plain that a contractual pro-
vision (including one appearing in the Articles) purporting to exempt a direc-
tor (to any extent) from liability for breach of duty would be void, that
provision does not seek to prevent the company from deﬁning the scope
of the duty itself, as successive cases have made clear.154 Provisions in the
Articles, and the other surrounding factual circumstances, will be crucial in
determining that scope, and it is submitted—in line with the principles and
authorities referred to above—that a provision which allows directors to
take on other (potentially competing) engagements, and to work for other
commercial organisations in circumstances that might lead to conﬂict, will
enable the courts to deﬁne the scope of the duty in a way that makes com-
mercial sense for both the director and the company. In other words, the
types of conﬂict that a director has a duty to avoid are determined by the sur-
rounding circumstances, including the terms of the Articles, just as the duty to
act in the corporate interests can be more or less demanding depending on
the role the director has undertaken and the capacity in which she is acting at
the relevant time.
4. Application of the test in practice
If the fact of having a separate capacity creates the possibility of a conﬂict,
then (as discussed above)155 section 175 requires that the separate capacity
should be disclosed and authorised. Once that has happened, it will be an
important part of the factual matrix that the court will examine to determine
the scope of the duties owed and, therefore, whether exploitation of a particu-
lar opportunity—or the withholding of information in relation to which the
director owes a duty of conﬁdence to a third party—amounts to a breach
of duty.
In most cases, the court is likely to ﬁnd that there is no duty to avoid con-
ﬂicts of interest (or indeed any other duty—including, importantly, the duty to
promote the success of the company) while a director is very clearly acting in
that other (fully disclosed and accepted) capacity. Just as it is clear that there is
153In this respect, it has the same effect as its predecessor, s 310 of the Companies Act 1985.
154This is also consistent with the principle applicable to ﬁduciaries more broadly that the terms of the
contract which establishes the relationship are relevant in determining the scope of the ﬁduciary’s
duty; see e.g. Northampton Regional Livestock Centre Company Ltd v Cowling and another [2014]
EWHC 30 [180].
155See supra discussion at n 91 and related text.
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no duty upon a director to vote any shares that she holds in the company in
accordance with her ﬁduciary duties as a director, because she is acting qua
shareholder, so a director who has an acknowledged separate capacity
outside the company is likely to have no duty to the company, or very
limited duties, when acting in that capacity. No exemption has been given
by the company from the duty; it is simply that the law will not impose a
duty in those circumstances.
Itmay be, of course, that a director has a number of different ‘capacities’with
several different companies, such as a business angel investor who sits on the
board of a number of portfolio companies. In each case, it will be necessary to
analyse the extent to which the director owes a duty to each company in
relation to opportunities discovered by her. Such an analysis might lead to
the conclusion that the opportunity should be offered to one of the companies,
if (for example) it arises out of the business angel acting in her capacity as a
director of that company. It is possible that it might give rise to a conﬂict
between two or more of the companies, particularly if the separate capacities
have not been well deﬁned and fully agreed to by the companies concerned.
But if the separate capacities have been properly delineated, the business
angel may not owe a duty to avoid conﬂicts to any of the companies in the cir-
cumstances in which the opportunity arises, and she will be free to exploit it
personally (or to take it to any one of the companies if she so chooses).
For the well advised NED, therefore, it will be vital to make full disclosure of,
and to get informed consent for any outside capacities that she wishes to
maintain during the continuance of her directorship. Ideally, the Articles
should speciﬁcally acknowledge that such outside capacities are permitted,
subject to disclosure and approval, but the empirical examination discussed
in Section C above reveals that only a minority of Articles do so. However,
given that the question is not whether breaches of duty are permitted but
whether the scope of a duty extends to the situation at hand, and since
that is a matter to which all surrounding circumstances are relevant, informed
consent of the board in a way permitted by the Articles to that outside
capacity should lead the courts to deﬁne the scope of the duty narrowly
enough to allow directors to take opportunities that accrue to them in that
separate capacity for their own beneﬁt (or the beneﬁt of some other
company or business to whom they owe duties).
Conclusion
In Section A of this article, I examined the existing state of corporate opportu-
nities law, in light of the twin tracks adopted by the common law and the choice
made by the 2006 Act to endorse the no-conﬂicts approach and reject the no-
proﬁts doctrine in its pure form. In Section B, I identiﬁed the residual problem
for the modern NED, which would arise from a very broad view of the law,
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coupled with the limitations imposed by section 232 on the ability of a
company to contract out of certain ﬁduciary duties. In Section C, I analysed
the provisions seen in the Articles of large listed companies since the new
rules on conﬂicts became effective, to identify the ways in which companies
seek to deal with this residual problem. I argued that some of these provisions
would not help a director who is facedwith a potential breach of duty and some
may even be invalidated by section 232. However, in Section D of this article I
argued that all is not lost: anNEDon the board of UK companymight expect the
courts to continue their ‘ﬂexible’ approach to deﬁning the extent of a director’s
duty to her company, and to examine all the surrounding circumstances
(including the Articles and the knowledge and approval of the board) in
doing so. In summary, the courtmust ask two questions: (i) given all the circum-
stances, including the company’s constitution, the role of the director in the
company, and the knowledge and consent of the company to her outside inter-
ests and activities, what is the scope of the duties owed by this director to this
company?And (ii) on the facts before the court, was there a breach of that duty?
Such an approach is likely to mean that where an opportunity arises, or
information is received ‘by reason’ of the director’s directorship (for
example, in the clearest case, when she receives it in a letter addressed her
as: ‘Ms X, Director of ABC Ltd’), personal exploitation of it would have to be
authorised by the company (either by the disinterested directors or by the
shareholders), because in most conceivable cases, the scope of the duty to
avoid conﬂicts would cover such a situation (assuming that it also gives rise
to a conﬂict, as deﬁned by the law). Any such authorisation (whether by direc-
tors or shareholders) would require speciﬁc information to be provided about
the opportunity and, in order for the director to be able to make alternative
use of the opportunity, that would also need to be speciﬁcally approved.
However, if the opportunity or information arises when the director is
acting in a separate capacity, provisions in the Articles that acknowledge
that a director is permitted to have separate capacities and authorisation of
that capacity by the board, will be helpful in making out a case that no
duty to avoid conﬂicts (or duty to promote success, or disclose relevant infor-
mation) applies. The question for the courts is not whether the Articles permit
a director to retain opportunities or withhold information (which may be too
general an exemption to be enforceable), but rather whether they contribute
to the factual matrix that enables them to conclude that no relevant duty
arises in the ﬁrst place.
It is perhaps unfortunate that Parliament did not take the opportunity provided
by the 2006Act to clarify the law in this area, and tomake it clear that it is open to a
company to restrict the scope of a director’s duties to a company, at least in the
important area of corporate opportunities law. It is to be hoped that the courts
will develop the new law in a way that ameliorates, rather than exacerbates, the
residual problem that the Act has perpetuated for the modern NED.
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